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This article analyzes the legal responses of the United States to is-
sues of refugee and asylum policy in the post-World War II pe-
riod that culminated in the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980.
The authors describe the consensus for a humanitarian, nondis-
criminatory policy which led to the passage of the Refugee Act.
This legislative history demonstrates the effort to develop a coher-
ent and flexible refugee admission policy and to create statutory
mechanisms to mediate the conflict between the executive and
legislative branches over the control and standards for refugee
admissions. The article evaluates the implementation of the Refu-
gee Act, proposals by recent administrations for reform, and of-
fers a series of recommendations for future refugee and asylum
policy.
"In good measure, our country's humanitarian tradition of extending a
welcome to the world's homeless has been accomplished in spite of, not be-
cause of our laws relating to refugees. "1
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The series of refugee crises which have erupted during the past
four decades has evolved into a chronic, worldwide condition. Be-
ginning with the people displaced by World War II, and continu-
ing through the Hungarians, the Palestinians, the Cubans, the
Vietnamese, the Haitians and the Afghani, the United States has
struggled to define its proper role in coping with the refugee prob-
lem. Not only were the mechanisms for dealing with the refugee
problem at issue, the very definition of a refugee constantly
changed. Further, the developmental process of such mecha-
nisms exemplifies the tug of war between Congress and the Exec-
utive to control the resolution of the problem.
With the coalescence of United States power in the interna-
tional arena following World War H, the American political lead-
ership projected the country's image as a haven for refugees from
persecution. While the United States attempted to build new alli-
ances with nations in different parts of the world, foreign policy
aims were continually frustrated by the restrictive and xenopho-
bic immigration policy embodied in the national origins system
and codified in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
(INA).2 Moreover, while the INA defined immigration quotas
along ethnic lines, inhibiting the United States' ability to offer ref-
uge to certain nationalities, it also made no separate provision for
the admission of refugees. The national quotas were character-
ized as a slur to those people with whom the United States was
trying to build alliances. At the same time the United States was
unable to respond adequately to the international refugee crisis
through a specific and permanent refugee admission policy.
Gradually, the United States publicly assumed responsibility for
refugees who were fleeing new conflicts in the developing world
as well as those displaced following World War H. The instability
of the post-war era evolved into a chronic condition and the
United States found itself a leader in a world that by 1980 had a
population of over fifteen million refugees. 3
When the permanent refugee admission quota was finally writ-
ten into law in 1965,4 its geographic, ideological and numerical
qualifications were already completely inadequate to deal with
House Comm. of the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on H.R. 2816].
2. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163.
(Codified as 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1157 (1952)).
3. Figures reprinted in United States Refugee Programs: Hearings before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 381 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as U.S. Refugee Programs].
4. The Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-
239, 79 Stat. 911 (1965) [hereinafter cited as the 1965 Amendments]. These amend-
ments were repealed in part by 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157-1159 (1980).
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the scope of the refugee problem. The permanent statute con-
strained the implementation of broader goals, and the executive
branch looked to other legal mechanisms for the admission of ref-
ugees. Such a mechanism emerged through the use of the Attor-
ney General's parole authority contained in section 212(d) (5) of
the INA.5 The friction between the flexibility of this ad hoc ad-
mission procedure, administered by the executive branch, and the
carefully delineated statute, passed by the Congress, was the
source of repeated conflict between the two branches of
government.
The culmination of these developments was the Refugee Act of
1980 (Refugee Act),6 the most comprehensive United States law
ever enacted concerning refugee admissions and resettlement.
This legislation, the result of extensive efforts by Congress and
the executive branch, creates for the first time a legal framework
for the admission of refugees to the United States that is coher-
ent, comprehensive and practical. The Refugee Act incorporates
the international definition of refugee from the United Nations
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (UN Convention).7
In so doing, it eliminates the geographical and ideological prefer-
ences that have dominated our system for the past three decades.
By adopting a universal approach to refugee admissions consis-
tent with international standards and norms, the new law places
primary emphasis on "special humanitarian concerns". 8 On the
other hand, the Refugee Act is a recognition that the United
States cannot accept an unlimited number of refugees from
around the world. It creates the basis for a refugee policy that
considers the existing limitations on our nation's resources and
the practical problems in administering such a program while
maintaining our national humanitarian commitment. The Refu-
gee Act also establishes, for the first time, the legal status and
statutory rights of asylum.9 It mandates a uniform asylum proce-
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d) (5) (1952) (amended 1980).
6. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102. (Codified as 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1157-1159 (1980)).
7. United Nations Conventions Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) as
incorporated into U.S. law by the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees (1967). 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.AS. No. 6577 (entered into force with respect
to the United States on November 1, 1968) [hereinafter cited in UN Convention].
8. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1157 (1980).
9. 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1980).
dure be established to evaluate asylum applications on a system-
atic and equitable basis.
This article focuses on three principal aspects of the United
States' refugee and asylum policy. First, it traces refugee pro-
grams of the United States dating back to post-World War HI ad-
missions from Europe. Second, it examines the legislative history
of the Refugee Act, a history showing the evolution of a consen-
sus for the humanitarian, nondiscriminatory policy finally embod-
ied in the Refugee Act. The history also highlights the purpose of
the Refugee Act, which is to move away from ad hoe refugee ad-
mission procedures and to create mechanisms to resolve the
ongoing friction between the Executive and Congress over control
of and standards for refugee admissions. Third, with the legisla-
tive history of the Refugee Act as background, the article evalu-
ates the implementation of the Refugee Act and advances a
number of specific recommendations.
These recommendations address problems in implementing ex-
isting law. We believe that the Refugee Act provides a sound and
practical legislative base from which a successful refugee policy
can be developed. Accordingly, we do not recommend nor do we
believe that it would be wise to modify the Refugee Act as en-
acted in 1980.
REFUGEE LAW AND PoLicy, 1948-19691o
From the end of World War 11 until 1970, the history of refugee
admissions into the United States is the story of a series of tem-
porary responses to emergency crises. The national origins
framework" established for immigration quotas insured that any
legislative or administrative measures for refugees would be cre-
ated on an ad hoc basis. As time passed, however, the divergency
in approach between the executive and the legislative branches
became striking. Insofar as Congress was willing to make excep-
tions to the restrictive immigration policy of the post-war era, ref-
ugees were admitted within narrowly circumscribed limits to
10. The material in this section is based in part upon the following: a) P. Glist,
History of the Seventh Preference (unpublished, on file with Hogan & Hartson,
Washington, D.C.); b) a background discussion of U.S. refugee laws and policies
contained in the House Report on the Refugee Act of 1979, H.IL REP. No. 608, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as H.M REP. No. 608]; c) SEN. COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, A REPORT UPON THE FORMATION OF THE SELECT COMMUSSION ON
IMIIGRATION AND REFUGEE POUCY: U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AND PoIucy: 1952-1979,
96th CONG., Ist Sess. (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter cited as U.S. IMIGRATION
LAw AND POLICY: 1952-1979].
11. The national origins quota system was repealed by 1965 Amendments,
Pub. L. No. 89-239, 79 Stat. 911 (1965), see note 4 supra. For discussion of the na-
tional origins system see note 18 infra.
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discharge responsibilities towards persons uprooted by the war,
or as a gesture to the anti-communist preoccupation of the Cold
War Era. Each legislative enactment was not to be viewed as
"any precedent or commitment."12 The executive branch, on the
other hand, viewed refugee admissions as an instrument of for-
eign policy. As a result, it had a more expansive perspective on
the United States' responsibilities in refugee crises, and began to
bypass the formal immigration limits through the device of the
Attorney General's parole authority.
The Displaced Persons Act of 1948
Congress enacted the first refugee legislation of the post-war
era, the Displaced Persons Act of 1948,13 only after eighteen
months of executive pressure.' 4 Eligibility requirements were
highly selective. The Act provided sanctuary only for certain dis-
placed, forced laborers from states conquered by Germany and
for certain refugees who qualified under the United Nations (UN)
refugee standards, particularly those who had fled Nazi or Fascist
persecution and those fleeing Soviet persecution. Technical cut-
off dates precluded the issuance of visas to ninety percent of the
displaced Jews who entered Germany, Austria and Italy.5 These
limits were modified to some extent by subsequent amendments
to the Act in 1950 and 1951.16
12. See, e.g., Conf. Rep., 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1953] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2122.23, which assured that the 1953 Refugee Relief Act, Pub. L.
No. 203, 67 Stat. 400 (1953) was an "emergency relief measure designed to imple-
ment certain phases of American foreign policy. It is not intended to represent
any precedent or commitment on the part of the Congress or the Government of
the United States to participate as an immigrant receiving country in any interna-
tional endeavors aimed at a permanent solution of the problem: of surplus popula-
tions as it now apparently exists in certain parts of Europe and Asia."
13. Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948).
14. See S. REP. No. 950, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1948] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2028, 2035; H.R. REP. No. 1854, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1948).
15. S. REP. No. 950; HLR. REP. No. 1854, supra note 14; President's Press Re-
lease of June 25, 1948, upon the signing of Pub. L No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948).
The 1948 Displaced Persons Act was severely criticized by Truman for adopting
these technical cut-off dates.
16. Amendment to Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat.
219 (1950). The amendment permitted new visas to be issued to anti-communist
refugees as an encouragement to anti-communists within the Soviet sphere; to
take in refugees from the People's Republic of China; to change the cut-off dates
previously used to prevent Jewish immigration (although only upon assurances
that the changes benefitted Soviet dissenters and that few "racial outcasts" would
immigrate). See H.R. REP. No. 581, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1950). The Displaced
The Refugee Relief Act of 1953
The INA17 made some modification in the national origins sys-
tem in effect since 1924 but like its predecessor contained no spe-
cific provision for the admission of refugees.18 As a result,
refugees had to be admitted through special enactments outside
the permanent admissions scheme. The emphasis in these meas-
ures was less on broad humanitarian goals than on giving encour-
agement and support to anti-communists. In furtherance of this
policy, Congress formulated the Refugee Relief Act of 195319 to al-
low admission of refugees including victims of natural calamities
and those from communist-dominated parts of Europe and the
Middle East. Special allotments were provided for Sweden, Iran,
and Greece (countries viewed as bulwarks of democracy against
Soviet expansionism).20 The Refugee Relief Act was extended in
1957,21 and visas were issued to "refugee escapees" defined as vic-
tims of racial, religious, or political persecution who were from
communist or communist-dominated countries or a country in the
Middle East.
With each of these legislative initiatives Congress maintained a
circumscribed policy and repeatedly ignored appeals by the State
Department to broaden the refugee admission criteria. When
over 200,000 Hungarians fled Hungary following the Soviet inva-
sion of that country in October 1956, President Eisenhower found
existing immigration legislation inadequate to deal with the scope
of the commitment the United States was called upon to make.
Persons Act was amended again by Pub. L. No. 82-60, 65 Stat. 96 (1951), thereby
extending the Act an additional 6 months.
17. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1157 (1952).
18. The 1952 Act modified and carried forward provisions of the two prior ma-
jor immigration laws. The Immigration Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 874 (1917), set forth
qualitative exclusion grounds. The Immigration Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 153 (1924), for
the first time provided numerical immigration restrictions based on maintaining
proportions of different races and nationals in the population through the use of a
"national origins" formula. (The 1952 Act also included provisions of the Internal
Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987.) The modified formula of the 1952 Act "set the
annual quota for an area at 1/6 of 1 percent of the number of inhabitants in the
continental United States in 1920 whose ancestry or national origin was attributa-
ble to that area." U.S. IMIGRATION LAw AND PoLicy. 1952-1979, supra note 10, at 7.
The national origins quota system was combined with a four-category selection
system in the allocation of visas to Eastern Hemisphere countries. There were no
numerical restrictions placed on Western Hemisphere immigration.
19. See note 12 supra.
20. H.R. REP. No. 608, supra note 10, at 2. The 209,000 visas issued under the
Act of 1953 were made available for these specific categories of refugees, separate
and distinct from visas available under the national origins quotas of the 1952 im-
migration law. During the approximately three and a half years that the 1953 Act
was in effect some 189,000 refugees were either admitted or adjusted their status to
immigrant.
21. Pub. L. No. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639 (1957).
[VOL. 19: 9, 19811 Refugee Act of 1980
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
With the "eyes of the world . . . fixed on Hungary" the United
States could not afford to make a mere token gesture.22 In late
November 1956, President Eisenhower announced an offer of asy-
lum to a total of 21,500 Hungarian refugees. Sixty-five hundred of
this number received visas under the expiring Refugee Relief Act.
Following informal discussions with congressional leaders, the
President authorized the admission of the remaining refugees by
requesting the Attorney General to exercise his parole author-
ity.23 The Attorney General's power to parole aliens into the
United States is contained in section 212(d) (5) of the INA which
(prior to the enactment of the Refugee Act) read as follows:
The Attorney General may in his discretion parole into the United States
temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent rea-
sons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest any alien apply-
ing for admission to the United States, but such parole of such alien shall
not be regarded as an admission of the alien and when the purposes of
such parole shall, in the opinion of the Attorney General, have been
served the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from
which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt
with in the same manner as that of any applicant for admission to the
United States.
2 4
Section 212(d) (5) was originally enacted to authorize the parole
of otherwise inadmissible aliens. Derived from early administra-
tive practice and operational instructions, it was designed to over-
come some of the stringent entry requirements contained in the
INA without allowing the alien the legal protections granted with
formal entry into the United States. 25 While both the prior ad-
ministrative practice and the legislative history of the INA indi-
cate a purpose to benefit individual aliens in emergency
situations, the 1956 Hungarian crisis heralded "the first, but by no
means the last," use of the parole provision for the mass admis-
sion of refugees.
2 6
22. See H. Doc. No. 85, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1957).
23. The State Department was informed by spokespeople of both the House
and Senate Judiciary Committees that parole was "the proper and lawful instru-
mentality for coping with the emergency in a manner consistent with the policy
outlined by the President. . ." See Hearings on H.R. 7700 Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration and Naturalization of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 485 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 7700].
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d) (5) (1952) (amended 1980).
25. For an excellent discussion of the administrative and legislative history of
the parole authority, see Comment, Refugee-Parolee: The Dilemma of the Indo-
china Refugee, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 175 (1975), and Kap, Refugees Under United
States Immigration Law, 24 CLEVELAND STATE L. REV. 528 (1975).
26. U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AND PoLacy: 1952-1979, supra note 10, at 18. A total
of 38,000 Hungarian refugees were eventually resettled in the United States utiliz-
The Fair Share Law of 1960
Congress acquiesced to executive leadership in paroling refu-
gees by enacting the Fair Share Law of 1960.27 The Attorney Gen-
eral gained the authority to admit, under the mandate of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), a fair
share of the refugees remaining in refugee camps in Europe.
That "fair share" was specified to be twenty-five percent of the
number of similar refugees resettled in nations other than the
United States. Allowance was also made for adjustment of status
after two years presence in the United States.28 Other provisions
were highly restrictive. For example, a State Department sugges-
tion to extend the terms of the Act to certain non-Europeans was
rejected.29 The Fair Share Law was criticized for its discrimina-
tion against certain groups of refugees and for its failure to estab-
lish by permanent statute a refugee admission procedure.
3 0
The Refugee Assistance Act of 1962
In 1961 and 1962, the practice of wholesale parole of refugees
was adopted.3 ' Also in 1962, Congress passed the Migration and
Refugee Assistance Act of 1962.32 This Act was to provide for the
resettlement needs of Cubans as well as to establish better fund-
ing the parole authority. The parole authority represented the one statutory
mechanism with sufficient flexibility to circumvent the structures of the legislative
enactments. One serious drawback, however, was that these refugees, were not le-
gally admitted into the United States; subsequent legislation was required to allow
for their adjustment of status.
27. Pub. L. No. 86-648, 74 Stat. 504(1960). Congress has been accused of taking
a contradictory attitude toward the use of the parole authority for refugee admis-
sions. On the one hand, it has criticized the Executive's use of the authority for
refugee admission programs, but has also "endorsed" that use by subsequently
enacting legislation for the adjustment of status of refugees paroled under various
programs. See note 26 supra. The "Fair Share Law" is only one, albeit major, ex-
ample of congressionally mandated and approved parole. In fact, on a number of
occasions Congress itself had initiated a refugee parole request. Congress has not
necessarily been critical of refugee parole in the abstract, but rather has been
wary of the unfettered and unmonitored use of parole for refugee admissions by
the Executive.
28. H.R. REP. No. 608, supra note 10, at 3.
29. S. REP. No. 1651, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1960] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 3124, 3140. The State Department had proposed that the definition of
"refugee" be broadened by deleting the requirement that refugees fall under the
mandate of the UNHCR. That proposal was rejected with a terse reminder that
the Act's "primary aim ... is to contribute to the closing of the remaining dis-
placed persons and refugee camps in Europe, such aim coinciding with the deter-
mined camp liquidation program of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees". Id. at 3140.
30. See, e.g., comments made on the floor of the House of Representatives re-
corded at 106 CONG. REC. 14387(1960).
31. See U.S. IMMIGRAMON LAw AND Pouicy: 1952-1979, supra note 10, at 46.
32. Act of June 28, 1962, Pub. L No. 87-510, 76 Stat. 121(1962)
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ing and coordination for international refugee assistance pro-
grams. The Migrations and Refugee Assistance Act had a limited
effect on refugee admission policy. This legislation is, however,
significant for refugees because it was the first measure to vali-
date and adopt a nondiscriminatory definition of refugee. In omit-
ting any special reference to refugees from communist-dominated
areas or "cold war" responsibilities, the statute also broadened
our national perspective on the origin and cause of refugee move-
ments, and implied our willingness to assist all who had fled their
homes. This was important in view of developing refugee
problems in Africa and elsewhere. 33 The more limited congres-
sional view was beginning to broaden.
The 1965 Amendments to the INA: Creation of the Seventh
Preference for Refugees
The first permanent statutory basis for the admission of refu-
gees was established by the 1965 Amendments to the INA.34
These amendments represented legislative recognition of the per-
manent nature of the refugee crisis and the United States' respon-
sibility to contribute to its alleviation. In most respects, however,
the amendments were essentially a codification of the restrictive
refugee standards developed for emergency relief since 1948. Sec-
tion 203(a) (7)35 provided for the use of up to six percent of the
total Eastern Hemisphere immigration quota (10,200 visas) for the
conditional entry of refugees as a new seventh "Preference" cate-
gory for admission.
The basic eligibility standards for the refugee preference were
derived from the Refugee Escape Act of 1957.36 A provision of the
1953 Act 37 for victims of natural calamities was also included.
To come within the ambit of section 203(a) (7) the alien had to
prove: 1) departure from a communist-dominated country or from
a country within the general area of the Middle East; 2) the de-
parture constituted a flight; 3) such flight was caused by persecu-
tion or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political
opinion; and 4) an inability or unwillingness to return. Further-
33. A. SCHWARTZ, THE OPEN SOCIETY 142 (1968), cited in U.S. IhMGRATION LAW
AN Pomcy: 1952-1979, supra note 10, at 48.
34. See note 4 supra.
35. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (7) (1952) (repealed by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(c) (7) (1980)).
36. Pub. L No. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639 (1957).
37. See note 12 supra.
more, the application could only be made through an immigration
officer in a noncommunist or noncommunist-dominated country.
Those who met ideological and geographical qualifications were
still excluded if they did not find their way to a noncommunist
country where the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
had established a processing office.
3 8
Under section 203 (a) (7) aliens were admitted as conditional en-
trants. The provision for conditional entry admission status was
derived from the Fair Share Law39 which had created a legisla-
tively endorsed parole status for refugees. While conditional en-
try was not a legal admission to the United States, a refugee
entering under that section could acquire permanent resident sta-
tus after two years in the United States without special
legislation.40
The 1965 Amendments repealed the national origins system and
substituted a system of priorities based primarily on reunification
of families and job skills. This substitution represented "the most
far-reaching revisions of immigration policy."41 In terms of re-
form of refugee admission policy, however, the amendments were
of limited effect because of the restriction imposed based on geog-
raphy and ideology. Proposals to extend refugee relief to North
Africa were rejected along with an administration suggestion to
reserve a pool of visas for emergency refugee relief free of geo-
graphic restrictions.42
By creating a permanent refugee admission provision in section
203(a) (7), Congress attempted to reassert its primacy in dealing
with the refugee problem and stated its express intent that parole
authority return to its original use for "emergent, individual, and
38. The 1965 Amendments supra note 4. See 8 C.F.R. 235.9(a) (1981) for INS
processing centers.
39. Pub. L. No. 86-648, 74 Stat. 540 (1960).
40. In contrast see note 26 supra. Nonimmigrants physically present in the
U.S. after two years who met the same eligibility requirements also could apply
for classifications as refugees and for permanent resident status.
41. See IMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNrrED STATES, 21-22 (3d ed. 1975). Harper
at 38 (1975) cited in U.S. IMMIGRATION LAw AND Pouicy: 1952-1979, supra note 10, at
51.
42. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 7700, supra note 23, at 559; Hearings on HR. 2580
Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
68(1965).
The Administration's recommendations would have been to reserve up to
twenty percent of the visas available for refugees whose "sudden dislocation
would require special treatment". Kennedy, The Immigration Act of 1965, 367 THE
ARNALs OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PoLricAL. AND SOCIAL SCmNCE 140(1966).
Sen. Kennedy, then Chairman of the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems con-
nected with Refugees and Escapees of the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S.
Senate, also advocated a flexible refugee admission policy. 111 CONG. REC. 28033
(1965) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
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isolated" situations.43 At the same time Congress recognized that
the parole authority could still be utilized for the admission of ref-
ugees "if such were deemed in the national interest of our
country."44
Congress failed in its efforts, however, because the permanent
refugee admission provision of section 203(a) (7) was inadequate
even as it was written. Despite the legislative admonition, the pa-
role authority continued to be required on a supplemental basis.
This was dramatically illustrated by President Johnson signing
the 1965 Amendments while simultaneously announcing the Cu-
ban airlift program, which thereby initiated an open-ended invita-
tion for thousands of Cuban refugees to enter the United States.45
In the years following 1965, the Executive continued to use parole
authority for refugee admissions, often to circumvent the obsolete
numerical and geographical restrictions imposed by Congress. 46
The use of parole as the major vehicle for refugee admissions
became increasingly awkward as it was never designed for that
purpose. In essence, the use of parole authority camouflaged an
unstated, hidden and ad hoc refugee admission policy. Critics ar-
gued that the use of parole violated the legislative intent of the
INA, and that no standardized procedures had been developed to
structure and guide its implementation. In partial mitigation of
those attacks, a practice evolved whereby the Attorney General
would consult with ranking members of the Judiciary Committees
of the House and Senate.47 Gradually the consultation procedure
43. S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3335 (1965).
44. In floor debate, Sen. Thurmond cautioned that despite language in the
House report scoring the past use of parole authority to admit refugees, and "at-
tempt(ing) to exclude its application to large groups of refugees,. . . I would ex-
pect this general rule of thumb would not forego in all cases the use of Section
212(d) (5) of the INA for the conditional entry of refugees, if such were deemed in
the national interest of our country". 111 CONG. REC. 24237 (1965).
45. Signing of the Immigration bill, the President's remarks at the ceremony
on Liberty Island, with his offer of asylum for Cuban refugees, Oct. 3, 1965. 1
WEEKLY CoiMnP. OF PRES. Doc. 364-67 (Oct. 11, 1965).
46. As previously discussed, the parole authority was used as a supplemental
device in later years to avoid the numerical limits set by the statute. See, e.g., the
discussion of the 1970 Czechoslovakian and Polish refugee parole programs note
52 infra. Parole has been used since 1972 for the admission of Soviet and other
Eastern European refugees. See discussion note 92 infra.
In addition, parole has been used for the admission of refugees ineligible under
the ideological and geographic limitations of the statute. See, e.g., the discussion
of the Ugandan and Chilean parole programs notes 76 and 91 respectively infra.
47. Some early parole programs were initiated either without prior congres-
became more institutionalized and hearings were often held on
specific parole requests.4 8 No formal guidelines, however, existed
on the conduct of the consultations or the dimensions of the con-
gressional role.
49
EARLY REFUGEE REFORM PROPOSALS 1970-1976
The Refugee Act was not a minerva springing from the heads of
Senator Edward Kennedy and Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtz-
man. It was, instead, the culmination of various attempts during
the 1970's to complete the tasks begun with passage of the 1965
Amendments to the INA.
While the 1965 Amendments represented a dramatic change in
the principles underlying immigration admission policy, com-
promises made during the legislative process had left many gaps.
The amendments did not, for example, include Western Hemi-
sphere selection priorities in conformity with the Eastern Hemi-
sphere preference system, nor did they create a worldwide
immigration numerical ceiling. The first congressional efforts to
change refugee policy emerged as parts of other bills that were at-
tempting to satisfy the objectives of the 1965 Amendments.
Various refugee reform provisions appeared in omnibus immi-
gration bills introduced through 1976 in the 94th Congress. These
reform proposals constituted a new approach to the definition of
refugee, as well as to how, and by whom, the admission of refu-
gees was to be controlled. While none was adopted into law, the
evolution of these different refugee proposals and the hearings in
which they were discussed helped to define the parameters of the
debate that finally resulted in refugee reform in 1980. These hear-
ings reveal the disparate interests of various congressional com-
mittees and executive departments (particularly State and
Justice), and the compromises made as negotiations progressed.
sional approval or with informal congressional endorsement. See note 23, supra,
for discussion of the original parole of Hungarian refugees in 1956.
48. Proposed Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act: Hearings
on H.R. 9112, H.R. 15092 and H.R. 173370 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1970) [hereinafter cited as INA
Hearings].
49. In addition to the lack of guidelines on consultation, the parole authority
had no predefined eligibility criteria; these conditions were entirely a matter of the
Attorney General's discretion. Parole thus became a highly politicized admission
device. For example, the Hungarians were admitted under liberal eligibility crite-
ria consisting of flight from Hungary after October 23, 1956, and qualification under
the regular provisions of the immigration law. See Swing, Hungarian Escapee Pro-
gram, 6 L & N. REP. 43(1965). Chinese refugees paroled from Hong Kong in 1962,
on the other hand, were subjected to far more restrictive requirements. See In
Chai, 12 L & N. Dec. 81(1967).
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In July and August of 1970 a House Judiciary Subcommittee
conducted hearings on three bills which proposed various refugee
reforms. 50 Congressman Peter Rodino, in his opening statement
at the hearings, expressed the spirit in which the refugee reform
aspects of these bills were being offered:
Since World War II, the Congress has enacted several major statutes au-
thorizing the admission of refugees, but it was not until the 1965 amend-
ments that a refugee provision became part of the permanent law.
Although this provision was laudable, it was obvious that this provision
was inadequate .... The position of the United States as a world leader
demands that we, with other countries of the free world, be in a position
to offer asylum to the oppressed. We must be able to take quick, effective,
and affirmative action to permit the orderly entry into the United States of
a fair share of refugees seeking freedom. We must uphold America's tra-
dition as an asylum for the oppressed.5l
That same year inherent problems had become evident with the
regular refugee admission provisions in the seventh preference
supplemented by the parole authority. In less than six months,
the 10,200 seventh preference numbers for 1970 already had been
exhausted by Czechoslovakian and Polish refugees. Members of
Congress, including every member of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee, approached a reluctant Attorney General to urge him to
exercise his parole authority. Attorney General Mitchell doubted
his authority because of the legislative history of the 1965 amend-
ments. As Congressman Rodino stated, "Li]n agreeing with this
request, the Attorney General advised the Committee that legisla-
tion in the refugee field was urgently needed and that the general
parole authority would be invoked for refugees only
temporarily."
5 2
At the same time Congress encouraged this use of the parole
authority, it disapproved unmonitored exercise of that authority
for refugee admissions by the Executive and the Attorney Gen-
eral. In these 1970 hearings, for example, subcommittee members
noted the lack of prior congressional consultation in the mass ad-
mission of Hungarians and Cubans. Representatives of the Exec-
50. INA Hearings, supra note 48. One bill was introduced in the Senate by
Sen. Kennedy. S. 3202, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 36964 (1969). Three
bills were introduced in the House: H.R. 15093, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG.
REC. 36942 (1969) (Companion bill to S. 3202 introduced by Congressman Feighan);
H.R. 9112, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 6731 (1969) Congressman Celler;
HR.. 17370, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REC. 13823(1970) Congressman Rodino.
Congressmen Celler's and Rodino's bills contained similar refugee provisions.
51. INA Hearings, supra note 48, at 57.
52. Id. at 58.
utive conceded that not until after 1965 had that branch begun
consulting with Congress before initiating a refugee parole
program.53
In attempting to address the inadequacy of the 1965 Amend-
ments Congress reviewed the refugee provisions of the bills con-
sidered during the 91st Congress. The bills had three major
objectives: to adopt a refugee definition which would embody a
changed admission policy; to establish a new numerical frame-
work; and to create a statutory mechanism for refugee admissions
which would include flexible procedures, usable standards, and a
system of consultations with Congress. Each of the bills con-
tained a definition of refugee without ideological or geographical
restriction.54 A refugee was defined in three parts, including:
1) an alien fleeing persecution from a communist-dominated
country; 2) an alien fleeing persecution from any country; and
3) an alien uprooted by natural calamity or military operations
and who is unable to return to his usual place of abode. In the
second part of the definitions two of the bills required that to be a
refugee an alien must "in the opinion of the Attorney General
[have a] well-founded reason for being unwilling to return to any
country due to persecution or fear of persecution." 55 Senator
Kennedy's and Congressman Feighan's bill more closely tracked
the language of the UN's Protocol 56 by expanding the bases of
persecution and eliminating any reference to the Attorney Gen-
eral's discretionary finding. In support of his bill Senator Ken-
nedy stated:
A comprehensive asylum policy for refugees is long overdue. We should
... broaden the definition of a refugee from its present European and
53. Id. at 200.
54. In the same sections the bills also eliminated the requirement that a refu-
gee be admitted from a third country and they prohibited the admission of an
alien refugee who was firmly settled. See companion bills of Kennedy and
Feighan, S. 3202/H.R. 15093 § 6(a), 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CoNG. REc. 36964
(1969); Celler's H.R. 9112 § 9, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 6731 (1969);
Rodino's 17370 § 9, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REc. 13823 (1970).
55. Celler's H.!. 9112 § 9, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 6731 (1969);
Rodino's H.R. 17370 § 9, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REc. 13823 (1970).
56. See note 54 supra for provisions of congressional bills. Pursuant to U.S.
accession to the UN Convention, supra note 7, regulations were promulgated to
protect the right to apply for political asylum (prior to 8 C.F.R. § 208 (1980)). This
right has been in addition to 8 U.S.C. 1253(h) (1952) regarding relief from deporta-
tion based upon a claim of persecution. See Note, Judicial Review of Administra-
tive Stays of Deportation: Section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q., 59., 114-20. Article I of the UN Convention states:
[O]wing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opin-
ion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country of
his former habitual residence ... is unable or, owing to such, fear is un-
willing to return to it.
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cold war framework, to include the homeless throughout the world-in
South America, southern Africa, and elsewhere. I would strongly suggest
a definition similar to that contained in the convention relating to the sta-
tus of refugees of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
Its inclusion in the basic immigration statute is a logical extension of ac-
cession by the United States, to the United Nations Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees in 1968.5
7
The Kennedy/Feighan definition was generally supported at
the hearings with the exception of State Department witnesses
who expressed some ambivalence, revealing the contradictory
pull of foreign policy concerns. While State Department wit-
nesses called for a liberal asylum policy, they cautioned that "de-
spite the overriding importance of the humanitarian side of the
picture, the broadened definition could present some difficulties
to the United States."5 8 They were reluctant to endorse an ex-
panded definition of refugee which might imply that a country
"persecutes some of its inhabitants,"5 9 a matter of considerable
sensitivity. The State Department had been essentially satisfied
with the procedures that had evolved because continued access to
open-ended parole authority readily met foreign policy needs. If
the broadened definition were adopted, the State Department in-
sisted upon a strong role for the President or Secretary of State in
defining and restricting the types of admissions "after a determi-
nation was made that it was in the interests of the United
States." 60
As their second objective, the bills attempted to create an ad-
mission mechanism with sufficient numerical flexibility to be re-
sponsive both to the unpredictable nature of refugee crises and to
the perceived humanitarian responsibility of the United States in
world affairs. Two different models to achieve this aim were pro-
posed. Congressmen Celler's and Rodino's bills repealed the sev-
enth preference and provided for admission of refugees outside
the numerical immigration preference system. Through an
amendment to the parole power the Attorney General would have
permanent statutory authorization to parole alien refugees with-
out predefined numerical, ideological or geographical limits.
61
This amended device would become the means of refugee admis-
sions, and the Attorney General's job would be "inestimably eas-
57. Hearings, supra note 48, at 87.
58. Id. at 168.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 167.
61. See note 55 supra.
ier" by lending legislative weight to the use of parole.62
Congressman Rodino, commenting upon the combined effect of
the new definition and the amended parole provision, stated:
This global authority in the absence of restrictions as to the number of
refugees who could be accepted would provide maximum flexibility in the
pursuit of humanitarian and foreign policy objectives. The United States
would be better able to cope with any arising emergency or other type of
refugee problems in a manner consistent with broader objectives. 63
Senator Kennedy and Congressman Feighan in their bill also
favored legitimization of the Attorney General's parole power but
as an emergency provision only. They wanted, however, to main-
tain and improve the seventh preference with a nondiscrimina-
tory refugee definition and to apply it worldwide in an expanded
numerical framework.64 Thus, they proposed that refugees consti-
tute ten percent as opposed to six percent of the worldwide ceil-
ing. Senator Kennedy explained at the hearings that his desire to
maintain a numerically fixed regular refugee admission category
sprang from practical considerations regarding present economic
problems of the United States and potential difficulties in devel-
oping political and popular support for this legislation.65
Both State Department and Justice Department witnesses testi-
fied in favor of the Kennedy/Feighan66 model. They viewed the
United States as unique among nations of the world in having a
regular statutory provision for the admission of refugees which
"along with its forerunners over the past twenty-five years repre-
sent an historical commitment to the admission of refugees in an
orderly and systematic way."67 A refugee preference establishing
the admission of a set number and fair share of the world's refu-
gees emphasized the United States' humanitarian concerns for
refugees and, according to State Department witnesses, "its elimi-
nation might well be misinterpreted."68 At the same time, volun-
tary agencies involved in the resettlement of refugees testified in
62. Western Hemisphere Immigration: Hearings on H.R. 981 Before the Sub-
comm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 249(1973)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 981]. In recognition of the foreign policy
dimensions of the refugee admission process, and past practice with refugee pa-
role programs, Congressman Rodino's bill conditioned the parole of refugees upon
a determination by the Attorney General after consultation with the Secretary of
State that such parole would promote the national interest. This was viewed as
consistent with the Migration and Refugees Assistance Act of 1962, supra note 32,
governing the use of funds for assistance in behalf of various categories of
refugees.
63. INA Hearings, supra note 48, at 58.
64. Kennedy's S. 3202 § 7/Feighan's H.R. 15092 § 6(a), 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115
CONG. REC. 36964 (1969).
65. Id. at 89.
66. Id. at 161.
67. Id. at 96.
68. Id. at 92.
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favor of maintaining a refugee preference. These agencies were
wary of leaving all the determination to the administrative course
and wanted an assurance of at least a fixed number of refugee
admissions.
69
The general need for congressional participation in the refugee
admissions process was the third major focus of the 1970 hear-
ings. The legislative proposals were evidence that subcommittee
members supported increased numerical and procedural flex-
ibility in refugee admissions. At the same time, Congress wanted
control over admissions. Both Congressman Celler's and Con-
gressman Rodino's bills provided for semiannual reports to Con-
gress by the Attorney General listing individual paroled aliens
and for congressional veto and subsequent termination of the pa-
role authorization by congressional enactment within ninety days
of such report.7o Neither Congressmen Celler's nor Rodino's bills,
however, were reported on favorably by the House Judiciary
Committee, and the Kennedy/Feighan bill died in Senate
subcommittee.
7 1
During the 93rd Congress, Congressman Rodino again intro-
duced legislation (H.R. 981)72 with two main goals: Western
Hemisphere reform and a worldwide quota on United States im-
migration. H.R. 981 contained refugee provisions very similar to
those in Rodino's previous bill (H.R. 17370), calling for a numeri-
cally unrestricted and legislatively endorsed parole mechanism as
the exclusive means of refugee admission. Significantly, Rodino
modified the refugee definition to more clearly conform with the
UN Convention.
While maintaining the tripartite definition of refugee, H.R. 981
amended the second part to refer to an alien fleeing from and un-
willing to return to any country owing to a well founded fear of
69. Id. at 181.
70. Celler's H.R. 9112 § 9, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 6731 (1969);
Rodino's H.R. 17370 § 9, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REC. 13823 (1970).
71. The Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization which had
jurisdiction over the legislation was headed by Sen. Eastland. Sen. Eastland was
also Chair of the full Senate Judiciary Committee. Sen. Kennedy, as Chair of the
Subcommittee to Investigate Problems connected with Refugees and Escapees,
had no legislative jurisdiction. Sen. Eastland was known to be hostile to refugee
reform efforts, and his chairmanship of the Committee and Subcommittee until
1978 was certainly a significant inhibiting factor in passage of a refugee reform
measure. Conversation with Jerry M. Tinker, former Counsel for Immigration and
Refugee Affairs, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (Sept. 8, 1980).
72. H.R. 981 § 9, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 61 (1973).
persecution "by reason of race, religion, nationality, or member-
ship in a particular social group, or of political opinion." 73 In this
respect, Congressman Rodino's H.R. 981 more closely paralleled
Senator Kennedy's former bill than his own earlier proposal. Fur-
thermore, while the bills introduced by Congressmen Rodino and
Celler in the 91st Congress had provided that fear of persecution
was to be established in the opinion of the Attorney General, H.R.
981 contained no comparable qualification allowing for the Attor-
ney General's discretionary finding. Although the Department of
Justice urged inclusion of this limitation during subcommittee
hearings,74 the phrase remained out of the bill in the final mark-
up. Unlike its posture in earlier hearings, the State Department
officially endorsed the broadened refugee definition, although
only in general terms.75
During the 1973 hearings on H.R. 981, discomfort with the aber-
rant use of the parole authority for refugees was more evident
than it had been in the 1970 hearings. This was due in part to the
launching of additional parole programs in the interim: the parole
of 200 Soviet Jews in 1972, resulting from a request to the Attor-
ney General by the House Judiciary Committee, and the parole of
1500 Ugandan Asians based on a recommendation by the State
Department.76 While Attorney General Mitchell's objections to
the exercise of his parole authority were less strenuous in these
instances, subcommittee members expressed considerable con-
cern over the lack of congressional involvement in the decision-
making process surrounding parole requests. The Attorney Gen-
eral's office was already committed to a policy of consultation
with Congress on refugee parole. The State Department, which
initiated most of the requests, for the first time promised to have
regular, formal hearings. The State Department, however, was re-
luctant to make consultation a statutory requirement.77 The ten-
sion surrounding the consultation issue markedly escalated.
When H.R. 981 was reported out by the House Judiciary Com-
mittee, the worldwide ceiling and preference system for the West-
ern Hemisphere were proposed.T8 The refugee definition had
been clarified and liberalized. In response to the urgings of Jus-
73. Id. In contrast see note 55 supra. See enumeration of the basis of perse-
cution track language of the UN Convention.
74. Hearings on H.R. 981, supra note 62, at 95.
75. Id. at 97.
76. Id. at 161. In 1973, 200 Soviet Jews who succeeded in leaving the USSR
were paroled into the U.S. INS ANN REP. 5(1973-74). On September 30, 1972, a deci-
sion was made to parole into the U.S. 1000 Ugandan Asians. An additional 500
were added to the parole program on April 3, 1973. INS ANN. REP. 5 (1973-74).
77. Hearings on H.R. 981, supra note 62, at 163.
78. See H.R. REP. No. 461, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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tice Department witnesses,79 the redundant definition including
both refugees from communist countries and refugees from any
country was deleted.8o The model of a permanent refugee prefer-
ence with a back-up emergency parole provision had been
adopted,81 but with an explicit requirement for consultation
among the Secretary of State, the Attorney General and Con-
gress. As with the bills in the 91st Congress, refugees were to be
admitted as conditional entrants without geographic or ideological
restrictions under an amended refugee definition in conformity
with the UN Convention.
The House bill proposed a broad and nondiscriminatory refugee
policy. The effect of amended H.R. 981 would have created a refu-
gee preference without ideological restriction for the Western
Hemisphere. A specific intent to provide for refugees from the
Western Hemisphere who were fleeing right-wing dictatorships
(as opposed to those from Cuba) was emphasized during floor de-
bates on the bill on September 25, 1973. As stated in these de-
bates, "recent events in Latin America, particularly in Chile and
Argentina... seem to indicate the need for this important revi-
sion in the law. Now the beleagured peoples of these lands will
have the opportunity to escape to freedom."8 2
In the amended H.R. 981 the provision for an open-ended parole
authority as the vehicle for refugee admissions had been aban-
doned. Instead, refugees were to be accommodated "within the
preference system and within the immigration limit"83 as seventh
preference conditional entrants.
Specific authorization was given to the Attorney General for the
parole of groups or classes of refugees beyond those permitted
under the conditional entry provision, but only under what the
House report described as "exceptional or emergency circum-
stances."8 4 Moreover, a group or class of refugees still had to sat-
isfy the definition of refugee, the Secretary of State had to
recommend the group for parole and find parole in the national85
79. Hearings on H.R. 981, supra note 62, at 95.
80. See H.R. 981 § 5, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 31359 (1973).
81. See H. REP. No. 1553, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 25(1976).
82. 119 CONG. REC. 31363 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Holtzman). The reference
was to the overthrow of the Allende government in Chile by a military coup and to
a military coup in Argentina.
83. Id.
84. See note 78 supra, at 11.
85. H.R. 981 § 6, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 61 (1973).
interest, and the Attorney General had to consult with Congress.
Congress wanted to avoid the possible creation of mass refugee
parole programs without prior congressional consultation. The
House report cited a history of the use of parole authority for
mass refugee admission programs, criticizing the parole provision
for being "simultaneously ambiguous and far too broad."86 The
Committee strongly expressed its desire that this authority be
brought under congressional control, asserting the importance of
consultation in the administration of the parole function. The
Committee report further stated that consultation meant, at a
minimum, consultations by the Departments of State and Justice
with the appropriate judiciary subcommittees.8 y
In the final analysis, Committee members were willing to main-
tain a flexible refugee admission policy if Congress was duly in-
formed and consulted. When the bill was debated on the floor,
Congressman Rodino reiterated this position, stating, "unless
there is full consultation by the Department of State and Justice
with the Congress regarding use of the flexible refugee parole au-
thority, we will necessarily have to return to a more restrictive
position."88
On September 26, 1973, the House passed H.R. 98189 but the
Senate Judiciary Committee took no action on the bill. In the
94th Congress, however, two bills90 were again introduced which
contained refugee provisions identical to those in the earlier ver-
sion of H.R. 981, which the House had passed. Hearings were held
on these bills as well as an administration bill (containing no new
refugee parole provisions) in September, October, and December
of 1975 and in March of 1976.91 The complexity of the refugee
86. See note 78 supra, at 12.
87. Id. at 25.
88. 119 CONG. REC. 31365(1973). It is significant that while the committee had
written in the amended H.R. 981 requirement of consultation for emergency group
parole, the provision in the original bill for a detailed report on paroled aliens as
well as for a congressional veto had been eliminated.
89. 119 CONG. REC. 31477 (1973).
90. The two bills H.RL 981, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG REC. 504 (1975) and
H.R. 367, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG REC. 193 (1975), introduced by Rodino and
Eilberg respectively, concerned Western Hemisphere immigration reform and con-
tained refugee provisions identical to the earlier IL1R 981. The Administration's
bill was H.R. 10323, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 33719 (1975). See H.R.
REP. No. 1553, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1976).
91. Proposed Amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act Hearings
on H.R. 367 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 74
(1974-75) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 367]. The initiation of Chilean and
Indochinese parole programs in the previous year may have dampened congres-
sional enthusiasm for the proposed reforms. Following the coup in that country, a
Chilean parole program involving at different times foreign nationals in Chile,
Chilean refugees in Peru and internally detained political prisoners had been con-
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question and the need for action on other proposals led to ques-
tions as to the propriety of immediate action on refugee reform.
While the UN refugee definition was again endorsed by a variety
of witnesses testifying at these 1975-1976 hearings, Congressman
Eilberg, new Chairman of the Subcommittee, voiced some doubts
as to the advisability of broadening the definition in light of an ex-
pansive parole authority. He was most disturbed with the ad hoc
nature for the consideration of parole in each emergency and the
need for uniform standards and criteria "to help prepare Con-
gress and INS for future emergencies." 92 Eilberg questioned
whether "in view of the nature of the emergencies that we have
faced and the troubles that exist in various parts of the world
right now [it would be] practical to adopt the UN definition with-
out further deliberation." 93 INS Commissioner Chapman agreed
that "the time [had] come-to standardize the procedure and prin-
ciples under which a refugee situation is handled in the future."9 4
He also agreed with the recommendation of Chairman Eilberg to
separate the refugee provisions from the rest of the bills and to
consider the refugee matter separately.
95
Subsequent to these hearings, the subcommittee markup re-
sulted in a clean bill which became Public Law No. 94-571.96 The
bill as passed was "non-controversial remedial legislation" limited
to that aspect of immigration law in most urgent need of reform,
"the inequitable regulation of Western Hemisphere immigra-
sidered. Consultation hearings with the Immigration Subcommittees of the House
and Senate had taken place. This was one of the first parole programs involving
refugees from a right-wing dictatorship and, thus, tested United States commit-
ment to a broadened refugee policy.
The proposed Chilean program had generated considerable controversy but
minimal action on the part of the Department of State, INS and Congress. While
the plight of the Chileans was being deliberated in subcommittee hearings in the
Spring of 1975, the evacuation of Indochina precipitated a request for one of the
largest parole programs ever, resulting in emergency congressional consultation.
The difference in scale between the Chilean and Indochinese programs, the dis-
crepancies in their criteria for admission, and their differing administration epito-
mized the problems inherent in the amorphous, discretionary parole mechanism.
For an excellent discussion of the Chilean parole programs, see Note, Behind the
Paper Curtain: Asylum Policy versus Asylum Practice, 7 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. AND
Soc. CHANGE 107(1978).
92. Hearings on H.R. 367, supra note 91, at 74.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 75.
95. Id.
96. Act of Oct. 20, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, 90 Stat. 2703 (1976).
tion."97 Public Law No. 94-571 extended the seventh preference to
the Western Hemisphere, a measure of limited utility since the
former restrictive refugee definition was retained.
Action on refugee reform, like other components of the overall
1965 package, was postponed. However, the issues and structure
of the debate had been well laid out in these early hearings and
bills. Congress was increasingly supportive of a nondiscrimina-
tory refugee definition and policy; each bill introduced was more
closely in conformity with the terms of the UN Convention. The
wide latitude of the Executive's authority in refugee admissions
led to a demand for more congressional control and a statutory
consultation requirement in refugee programs, a pervasive theme
throughout this six-year debate. At the same time Congress was
calling for legislative action the Executive was relatively content
with the status quo. The State Department, in particular, ac-
knowledged the administrative problems in the parole provisions
but was jealous of the prerogative it had by virtue of this unde-
fined authority. These were the tensions that had surfaced and
remained to be resolved. The problems consequent to the mas-
sive Indochinese parole program would crystalize these issues
even further and provide the final motivation for the statutory for-
mulation of a new refugee policy.
THE INDOCHINESE PAROLE PROGRAM AND THE 1977-1978 HEARINGS
ON THE ADMISSION OF REFUGEES
In 1976, over 130,000 refugees were evacuated from Indochina.
Most were paroled and resettled in the United States. While the
Indochinese as refugees from communism were technically eligi-
ble for conditional entry, the magnitude of the exodus and the re-
settlement effort made parole the only feasible method for their
admission.98
The use of the parole authority as a vehicle for Indochinese ad-
missions further underscored the inadequacies of the ad hoc pro-
cedures which were not supported by specific policy or planned
objectives. It was apparent from the time of the 1975 evacuation
that a regular flow of refugees would be leaving Indochina for a
foreseeable period, yet the unstructured nature of the parole
mechanism encouraged the executive branch to avoid planning
for this apparent inevitability. Instead, "the Executive was put in
the position of waiting repeatedly until the number of refugees in
97. H.R. REP. No. 1553, supra note 90, at 7.
98. SEN. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REVIEW OF U.S. REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT
PROGRAMS AND POLICIES, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 10 (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter
cited as REVIEW OF U.S. REFUGEE RESETTLEmENT 1979].
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the countries of first asylum reached crisis proportions and then
declaring an emergency which required yet another special
program."99
The sequence of ad hoc parole programs,100 the elimination of
refugee clauses from the 1976 Act, an announcement by the Ford
Administration of a moratorium on new parole programs' 0' and a
pledge by President Ford to cooperate in legislative efforts at ref-
ugee reform, motivated a new congressional effort to formulate a
refugee law. The immediate result was the initiation of hearings
in 1977 (continuing through 1978) before the House Subcommittee
on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law on admission
of refugees into the United States. 0 2 During these hearings two
bills (H.R. 3056 and H.R. 7175) "to review the procedures for the
admission of refugees" were considered. 0 3
Concurrently, the Indochinese crisis continued to escalate, and
the plight of the boat people received increasing world attention.
The Carter Administration, not considering itself bound by Presi-
dent Ford's moratorium, initiated yet another parole program in
1977. Informal consultation with Congress on this program, in-
volving 15,000 Vietnamese boat and land refugees, occurred dur-
ing these 1977 congressional hearings on refugees. The
Subcommittee disapproved of the confused procedures involved
99. 125 CONG. REc. S.3037 (1979) (Remarks of Sen. Kennedy) The Indochinese
parole program was the most dramatic but not the only example of the problem
(at least as perceived by certain congressional members) of the use of the parole
authority for refugee admissions. The insufficiency of the seventh preference
numbers could no longer be viewed as a sporadic occurrence, but the parole au-
thority was regularly being used as a "supplementary" provision. Thus, for exam-
ple, a major and on-going Soviet refugee program was being developed during this
period. In January of 1977, 4,000 Soviet refugees were paroled into the U.S.; an ad-
ditional 5,000 were authorized in December of 1977. By the end of the hearings on
the Admission of Refugees (note 102 infra), an additional 12,000 person parole pro-
gram was authorized from the Soviet Union and other Eastern European coun-
tries. See U.S. IMIGRATION LAW AND Poucy: 1952-1979 supra note 10, at 107.
100. For a description of the different parole programs with varied selection cri-
teria initiated through May 1976, see Review of U.S. Refugee Resettlement 1979,
supra note 98 at 10-11.
101. Id. at 11.
102. Hearings on H.R. 3056 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship
and Int' Law of the House Comm on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on Admission of Refugees into the United States].
Admission of Refugees, Part H. Indochinese Refugees and U.S. Refugee Policy,
95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1977-78) [hereinafter cited as Admission of Refugees,
Part II].
103. M.R. 3056, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 3413 (1977); H.R. 7175, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 14648 (1977).
in the request, the lack of selection criteria, and the abandonment
of those criteria formulated in the 1976 program. 0 4 While Chair-
man Eilberg pressed for more formal consultation procedures, the
Administration viewed the existing informal requirement of con-
sultation with Congress as an impediment to effective response to
the emergency at hand.105 Subcommittee members complained
that they received no facts or figures during consultations on
emergency parole requests "so that about all that the Administra-
tion was accomplishing at various points in these various pro-
grams was conveying to us their sense of emergency but certainly
no sense of refugee policies."106
Chairman Eilberg criticized the Administration for initiating
the parole request without a proper presentation of facts, either
by the State Department to the Attorney General or by the Attor-
ney General to the Congress. Even the informal procedures were
being ignored. In fact, Subcommittee members came to view the
Attorney General as a mere conduit for White House requests, a
scheme which successfully insulated the White House from ac-
countability. Congressman Eilberg complained that, over the
preceeding year, he had repeatedly requested the INS and the At-
torney General to establish guidelines and regulations governing
the conditions for parole, but had received no response. The Sub-
committee saw the parole request as "a classic case, which dem-
onstrates the need for legislation." 07 The impetus for refugee
reform deepened as the Executive, as well as the Congress, was
104. Description of the criteria found in The Indochinese Exodus, A Humanita-
rian Dilemma, GAO Report to Congress, May 24, 1979 [hereinafter cited as GAO
Report].
105. Admission of Refugees, Part I1, supra note 102, at 25. In fact the subcom-
mittee had not acted for several months on the May 1976 parole request This con-
gressional "sabotage" was cited during later hearings as a reason for executive
branch resistance to formalized consultation procedures. See, e.g., The Refugee Act
of 1979: Hearings on S. 643 Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 36 (1979).
106. Hearings on Admission of Refugees into the United States, supra note 102,
at 9.
107. Admission of Refugees, Part II, supra note 102, at 28. The previous Attor-
ney General, Edward Levi, had agreed not to grant parole if a majority of either
the House or Senate Judiciary Committees disapproved. But Attorney General
Bell, when questioned during the hearings, made it clear that while consultation
with Congress was essential, he still had the ultimate authority and responsibility
to exercise the parole power. At the same time the Attorney General reiterated
his own discomfort with the unguided nature of the parole authority. Id., at 23. In
testimony before the House Committee on the Judiciary on Nov. 28, 1978, he sum-
marized these problems. "I am not comfortable about the use of the parole au-
thority in ... situations where I have exercised that authority in the past. Nor is
this discomfort unique to me. Every Attorney General before me, faced with such
requests, has voiced similar reservations because the intent of Congress, in estab-
lishing the parole authority, was to provide a safety valve for unusual, individual
cases of compelling need that could not otherwise be met. It was not to provide
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experiencing the effect of a poorly focused and unorganized refu-
gee admission policy. The absence of a coherent refugee policy,
as demonstrated by the use of sporadic, ad hoc parole actions,
created needless uncertainties for voluntary agencies and for
United States officials participating in resettlement.108 In addi-
tion, it confused other nations, causing them to become less moti-
vated to share in refugee relief.109
Congress, in response to the severe limitations and conse-
quences of the existing ad hoc policy, considered bills during the
1977-1978 hearings (H.R. 3056 and its successor H.R. 7175),11o
which contained more explicit and elaborate structures for refu-
gee admission than had earlier bills. In many respects, the two
bills were a compendium of previously debated legislation. The
refugee definition closely resembled the UN Convention defini-
tion, which received for the first time the unambiguous endorse-
ment of the State Department."' The bill contained a ban against
firmly resettled refugees," 2 a provision which had appeared in
every reform proposal since the 91st Congress. Like the admis-
sions models that had been agreed upon in the earlier hearings,
the bill set out a two-tier admissions structure. It included a nu-
merically defined "normal flow" admission category of 20,000 an-
nually accompanied by a separate provision for emergency
admissions initiated only after consultation with the House Judi-
ciary Committee and the Senate Judiciary Committee."
3
the means to end-run the other provisions of the immigration law." REVIEW OF
U.S. REFUGEE RESETrLEMENT 1979, supra note 98, at 9.
108. See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 104, at 6.
109. Admission of Refugees, Part II, supra note 102, GAO Report, supra note
104, at 6. As Attorney General Bell stated: As a result [of the ad hoc nature of the
U.S. Refugee policy] we are unable to give clear signals to other nations about the
extent of our ability to meet world refugee needs. We are unable to plan effec-
tively .... Finally and most regrettably-individual refugees are hostage to a
system that necessitates that their plight build to tragic proportions so as to estab-
lish the imperative to act.
110. H.R. 3056, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 3413 (1977).
111. Id. at § 42. For State Dept. endorsement, see Hearings on Admission of
Refugees into the United States, supra note 102, at 78.
112. Id. at § 207(a).
113. Id. With the creation of a separate refugee admission process, the seventh
preference was to be repealed. The later bill (H.R. 7175) specifically provided for a
commensurate reduction in the Eastern and Western Hemisphere quotas. The six
percent of the annual Eastern and Western Hemisphere quotas which was allo-
cated to the seventh preference was reassigned to second preference spouses and
unmarried sons and daughters of lawful permanent residents. In a provision simi-
lar that in the seventh preference, LR 3056/-LR. 7175 provided that up to 5,000 of
There were, however, major changes signifying the heightened
conflict between the Executive and the Congress over two major
issues. First, Congress had become increasingly committed to nu-
merical limits. This commitment reflected a growing antagonism
within the United States to increased immigration in general, a
feeling crystallized by the very large number of Indochinese ad-
mitted into the country since 1975. The Executive, on the other
hand, wanted unfettered autonomy in deciding the number of ref-
ugees admitted while maintaining its ability to be politically se-
lective in excluding some nationalities altogether and allowing
extremely generous quotas for others.
The second dimension of the conflict involved competition be-
tween the two branches for control over refugee decision-making.
Congressional bills consistently sought formalized consultation,
and veto power or legislative review over executive action. The
Executive persistently sought maximum insulation from congres-
sional oversight. Thus, the Congress' call for limitations was not
simply a reflection of a new restrictionist attitude, but an expres-
sion of its felt need to structure and control executive decision-
making.
The congressional reaction to this conflict was to move away
from the flexibility of earlier bills. H.R. 3056, for the first time,
contained numerical and categorical limitations on emergency ad-
missions and retained more power and access to information in
Congress.114 Parole as a vehicle for emergency admissions was
rejected as too tainted by past executive abuse to receive statu-
tory legitimization. The parole authority was specifically
amended to prohibit the parole of a refugee.1 5 Instead, the bill
established two emergency refugee categories which were to be
the exclusive basis for triggering the President's authority to initi-
ate a refugee admission program."16
The formulas for these categories, however, were based on past
practices. The emergency refugee categories in H.R. 3056 were in-
tended to be modeled on the two principle types of past parole
programs: a refugee emergency determined by the President to
be of special concern to the United States would authorize the
President to admit 20,000 refugees; an appeal from an interna-
tional refugee organization would enable the President to admit
the 20,000 total refugee admissions could be used to adjust the status of non-immi-
grant aliens who had been in the U.S. for 2 years and qualified as refugees. Both
of these concepts were incorporated into the Refugee Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a)
(1980); 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (1980).
114. H.R. 3056, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 123 CONG. REc. 3413 (1977).
115. Id. at § 212(d) (5).
116. Id. at § 207(b).
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fifteen percent of the total involved, or 5,000 refugees, whichever
is less. The President was required to solicit the cooperation of
the international community in resettling refugees and, in the lat-
ter event, to make a determination that other countries in the in-
ternational community would accept their fair share for
resettlement.
Congress attempted to retain more authority than it had in the
past. Any emergency refugee program decision had to be made in
consultation with the House and Senate Judiciary Committees
upon a determination that the emergency admissions would sig-
nificantly promote the national interest, were justified by grave
humanitarian concerns and were not possible under the regular
admission provisions." 7 The congressional veto provision was re-
stored,"n8 as well as a detailed reporting requirement similar to
that contained in the earlier version of H.R. 981 in the 93rd Con-
gress." 9 In reaction to the perfunctory nature of recent consulta-
tions and the incongruity and inadequacy of the Attorney
General's role as the Executive's agent, responsibility for emer-
gency admissions was shifted from the Attorney General's office
to the President. By this transfer, Congress attempted to institu-
tionalize the White House's role and thereby allow the President
to draw on the entire resources of the executive branch. Conse-
quently, consultations would be more effective, involving the ac-
tual rather than figurehead decision-makers in the executive
branch.12
0
While Congressman Eilberg urged numerical and categorical
limits on refugee admissions, State and Justice Department wit-
nesses continued to advocate autonomous executive jurisdiction
over emergency programs. Numerical and categorical limits on
emergency refugee admissions were attacked as antithetical to




119. Id. at 207(d). The reporting requirements varied to some extent from
those provided in H.R. 981. However, the bill did require detailed reports as to
each alien admitted under the emergency provisions.
120. Id. at 207(b); Hearings Admission of Refugees into the United States, supra
note 102, at 67. This shift in authority was incorporated into the Refugee Act, see 8
U.S.C. § 1157(b) (1980).
121. The voluntary agencies also opposed the emergency provision. Hearings
on Admission of Refugees into the United States, supra note 102, at 124-25.
The Executive's position on numerical limits, however, was not
always clear or internally consistent. State Department repre-
sentatives, for example, maintained their support for a "normal
flow" admission category deducted from the overall hemispheric
totals in order to leave the absolute numerical limits unchanged
"until there is a more solid basis for determining the optimum
rate of annual migration to the United States."122 At the same
time, they conceded that the emergency procedures would have
to be invoked on a regular basis to accommodate backlogs in on-
going programs (e.g., Soviet refugees awaiting refugee processing
in Rome) resulting from the inadequacy of the 20,000 normal flow
limit.123
In the face of strong congressional support for numerical limits,
the State Department compromised and for the first time advo-
cated a statutory consultation.124 It made a proposal which, with
some modifications, would be adopted in the 1980 legislation. 25
State Department witnesses suggested that the terms of an emer-
gency refugee program, including admission quotas, could be
"settled between the executive and legislative branch in advance
of implementation, through the consultative process provided in
the bill."126
The Subcommittee, however, was wary of continuing to allow
the Executive discretion without enforceable, delineated stan-
dards, and a stronger consultation mechanism. H.R.7175 thus pro-
vided a specific definition of consultation as personal contact
between the President and "appropriate members of the Commit-
tee ... to review the emergent refugee situation, to project the
extent of possible United States participation therein" and to pro-
122. Id. at 61. The State Department argued that the 20,000 number did not rep-
resent any actual increase (although the seventh preference allowed for only
17,400 annually). Under the proposed law, accompanying spouse and children
would be charged to the new refugee quota, whereas before many had entered the
U.S. as non-preference immigrants.
123. Id. Congressman Eilberg criticized the Executive's failure to evaluate the
social and economic impact to immigration and refugee policy and what he per-
ceived to be the Executive's inability rationally to consider the numerical scope of
refugee admissions. Congressional and executive representatives agreed that a
"wide ranging study of immigration policy" was necessary; in fact, IR. 7175 pro-
posed the creation of a Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy.
H.R. 7175, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5, 123 CoNG. REc. 14648 (1977). But there was
strongly voiced sentiment in the Subcommittee to the effect that continuation of
ad hoc procedures and further procrastination of refugee reform in order to await
the results of such a study was intolerable: "We have every intention of moving
this legislation in this Congress". Hearings on Admission of Refugees into the
United States, supra note 102, at 71.
124. Id. at 68.
125. See 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a) (b) (d) (1980).
126. Hearings on Admission of Refugees into the United States, supra note 102,
at 70.
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vide the committees with specified types of information. 27 A sim-
ilar provision would appear later in the Refugee Act.128
Congressionally imposed selection standards were established
by the bill's requirement of a presidential determination that an
emergency admission of "special concern" to the United States,
"will significantly promote the national interest... ," and is "jus-
tified by grave humanitarian concerns."' 29 The intended meaning
of these terms was suggested by legislative attempts to articulate
some general principles and cull some standards from the prac-
tice of past parole programs, in order to establish guidelines for
future emergency admission policies.
During the hearings, State Department witnesses in defining
the "special concern" terminology, repeatedly referred to funda-
mental humanitarian traditions and principles. When questioned
about American "special concern" in Latin America, Assistant
Secretary of State for Humanitarian Affairs Patricia Derian
responded:
There are large numbers of people throughout Latin America who have
gone from their homeland to another country because they are fleeing for
their lives because of political views... the special concern of the United
States is humanitarian. And also it is connected with our "Human Rights"
policy as well.
When we go and ask governments to release people who have been in
detention for long periods with no charges, no chance to defend them-
selves in the orderly method of due process, we have encouraged them to
change and try the people or to release them from detention, particularly
in the cases of some people who are being abused and mistreated. And
these are the cases of special humanitarian and policy concern for us.13 0
When asked what factors were considered by the Department
of State in determining American response to appeals from inter-
national rescue organizations, a State Department witness stated,
"the humanitarian factors, [and] to what extent is it an emer-
gency." He continued:
We consider our national security, the extent of our concern and interest
in particular refugee groups, the interest or lack of interest among the ref-
ugees in coming to the United States, our capacity to absorb the refu-
gees-that is, voluntary agency willingness and capacity to provide
sponsorships; and... resettleability of the refugees in question. Those
127. H.R. 7175, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 207(b) (4), 123 CONG. REC. 14648 (1977).
128. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(e) (1980).
129. H.R. 3056 § 207(b), 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 3413 (1977); H.R.
7175 § 207(b), 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 14648 (1977). For similar section
in Refugee Act see 8 U.S.C. § 1157(b) (1980).
130. Admission of Refugees, Part II, supra note 102, at 269.
are some of the factors that are taken into account.
1 3 1
These humanitarian goals were emphasized repeatedly during
the hearings as the underlying basis for post-war refugee policy.
Humanitarian concern was cited by one State Department wit-
ness as the rationale for much of the American foreign policy in-
terest in refugees:
[W]e should remember that the United States is a land of immigrants,
and since the founding of the Republic we have had a special national her-
itage of concern for the uprooted and persecuted... beyond our national
ethos of humanitarian concern for the uprooted and persecuted, there are
solid foreign policy reasons why we should involve ourselves substantially
and regularly in resolving refugee problems. . . it is decidedly in our for-
eign policy interest to project in countries around the world the image of
U.S. humanitarian assistance for refugees. Such humanitarian assistance
is a glowing example of the purposes and processes of the free democracy
which we are, and of the free society which makes such assistance
possible.
13 2
Congressman Eilberg himself was confronted with the primacy of
the humanitarian factor in admitting refugees. He introduced a
list of factors that he believed had been considered in past parole
programs and proposed that these be incorporated as statutory
guideposts for future determination. Many in fact did appear in
the ultimate legislation.133 Among these factors were: 1) the
United States' relationship with the first asylum countries;
2) pressures exerted in the asylum country; 3) pressure exerted
by UNHCR; 4) pressures exerted by the voluntary agencies;
5) foreign policy considerations; and 6) domestic considerations
such as the unemployment rate and domestic conditions in gen-
eral. When asked to comment on these factors, General Chap-
man, the Commissioner of Immigration responded:
I think each of those is a significant factor. I believe omitted, however,
is the most important of all and that's our national tradition of humanita-
rian concern. It seems to me that it is on that basis and from that point of
our national drive and tradition that we have admitted most of the refu-
gees over the past years.
13 4
The Executive's interest in maintaining maximum flexibility
and a broad humanitarian stance was apparent from its reactions
to other parts of H.R. 3056 and H.R. 7175. Executive witnesses ob-
jected to the congressional veto because sudden termination of
previously agreed upon programs would be "disruptive of a har-
monious" relationship between the two branches and could place
the United States in "an awkward international position of being
131. Id. at 47.
132. Hearings on Admission of Refugees into the United States, supra note 102,
at 16.
133. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c) (1980).
134. Hearings on Admission of Refugees into the United States, supra note 102,
at 91.
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unable to honor a commitment to participate in a refugee resettle-
ment of a multilateral character."135 State Department witnesses
also criticized the "fair share" limitation in the bill.
We fully agree that the resettlement of refugees is a matter of interna-
tional concern and that we must vigorously encourage international par-
ticipation in refugee problems. To hold back until this participation is
assured however, could deny our role as a leader in the field of humanita-
rian concerns in the international community. In addition, the United
States should not turn its back on refugees simply because other nations
may do so.
1 3 6
Justice Department witnesses commented that "humanitarian
concerns present in emergent refugee situations should not be
made subject to numerical limits inflexibly set by statute."137
The executive branch was also concerned about the limitations
of the definition of "refugee". While adopting the UN definition
generally, the bills precluded those whose primary motivation for
fleeing was economic.138 This qualification was sharply and uni-
formly criticized. State Department and Justice Department wit-
nesses explained the mixed nature of most refugees' motivation,
and the ability of governments to impose economic sanctions for
political reasons. An explicit statutory exclusion of economic ref-
ugees might eliminate many bona fide refugees. "Economic ad-
vantage is at least part of the attraction which brings many to our
shores, and the chance that the confused refugee in his first deal-
ings with an American officer might admit this to his permanent
detriment suggests that the provision not be in the bil."'39
Others saw the distinction as "spurious" and at least potentially
"invidious."140
While the statutory definition of refugee in the House bill re-
ferred to a person outside the persecuting country, State Depart-
ment and other executive branch witnesses repeatedly testified to
135. Id. at 79. The view was also expressed that the legislative veto was uncon-
stitutional "since Congress would both retain control over enforcement of the leg-
islation in violation of the principle of separation of powers and also be able to
repeal a power given to the President without giving the Executive the opportu-
nity to exercise the right of veto conferred by Article r. Letter from Office of Le-
gal Counsel, Department of Justice, to Congressman Eilberg, quoted in Admission
of Refugees, Part II, supra note 102, at 225.
136. Hearings on Admission of Refugees into the United States, supra note 102,
at 79.
137. Id. at 82.
138. H.R. 3056, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 207(a), 123 CONG. REC. 3413 (1977).
139. Admission of Refugees, Part 11, supra note 102, at 174.
140. Id. at 154.
the need to assist persons still within their country of nationality.
An absolute bar on the use of the parole power was opposed by
these witnesses because of its potential usefulness in assisting
those applying for entrance at the border and those outside the
persecuting country but within a third country where there might
be imminent danger of repatriation.141 Parole, it was contended,
should be available for these situations, and the INS should plan
to have additional offices in new locales to accommodate the geo-
graphically and ideologically broader group which would be seek-
ing admission. 42
Another focus of discussion was Congressman Eilberg's propo-
sal that the withholding of deportation provisions of section 243
(h) of the INA143 be made available in exclusion as well as depor-
tation proceedings. 44 In Eilberg's proposal, however, this relief
was to be unavailable to those who entered illegally, unless they
presented themselves without delay to an immigration officer and
could demonstrate good cause for the illegal entry. Aliens who
engaged in the persecution of others also would be ineligible for
this relief.145
While INS, State Department and other witnesses supported
Congressman Eilberg's proposal on the extension of section 243
(h) benefits to excludable aliens, they strenuously opposed the
exclusion of illegal entrants. The qualification was characterized
as excessively harsh treatment which would be "out of character
with our traditional concern for refugees and could conflict with
141. Hearings on Admission of Refugees into the United States, supra note 102,
at 80.
142. Id. at 76, 92-93.
143. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1965) (amended 1980).
144. The INA makes a fundamental distinction between those aliens who have
effected an entry into the U.S. (whether with a visa or without a visa and without
being inspected by immigration officers) and those who have attempted but have
not accomplished a formal entry. The former if alleged to be in violation of their
status are subject to deportation proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1952). The lat-
ter are subject to exclusion proceeding under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1952).
As early as 1958, the Supreme Court had held that aliens in exclusion proceed-
ings did not have access to section 243(h). Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185
(1958). However, the unavailability of section 243(h) or asylum procedures in ex-
clusion hearings had been the subject of administrative and judicial challenges.
See Matter of Pierre, 14 I. & N. Dec. 467 (1973), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 434 U.S. 962 (1978). Congressman Eilberg's legislative proposal was an
obvious response to this litigation, which also resulted in a change in INS proce-
dures. For a more complete discussion, see 56 Interpreter Release 189 (1979).
145. The latter exception encompassed those "who have engaged in the perse-
cution of individuals on account of the individuals' race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership of a particular social group, or political opinion". It also excluded from the
benefits of section 243(h) aliens "who in the opinion of the Attorney General, con-
stitute a danger to the community or to the security of the United States". This
was incorporated into the Refugee Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1980).
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our obligations under the Protocol."1
46
The INS did not initially see the need for a statutory asylum
procedure given the proposed reforms in section 243 (h),147 but
Subcommittee members were uncomfortable with continuing to
leave the matter to administrative regulation. The Subcommittee
advocated a statutory provision in order to prevent dilatory abuse
of existing procedures by aliens, and to assure the alien applying
for asylum basic due process protections. To support its position,
the Subcommittee referred to its report which criticized, on due
process grounds, procedures followed by INS in adjudicating Hai-
tian asylum and section 243(h) claims. Because the politicized
nature of executive practice in the asylum area concerned Con-
gress, some members supported statutory asylum procedures in
order to assure the extension of the asylum remedy to those flee-
ing persecution from noncommunist countries.1
4 8
An emerging consensus and a more precise outline of what was
to be the Refugee Act of 1980 became apparent in the final session
of the hearings in April 1978. In that session the Administration
finally responded officially to Congressman Eilberg's proposals on
refugee legislation. Compelled by its need to preserve credibility
in the international community and to bring order into the refu-
gee admission process, the Administration gave its concrete sup-
port to the legislative effort. By this time the Administration
achieved some long-term perspectives on its major parole pro-
grams and therefore simultaneously requested ongoing parole au-
thorization for Indochinese, Eastern European and Soviet
refugees "until new refugee legislation was passed."' 49 A major
force behind refugee reform, Senator Kennedy a month earlier
had introduced legislation in the Senate (S. 2751) which paral-
leled some of the Administration's positions. This legislation pro-
vided the immediate impetus for the Administration to come forth
with concrete proposals.150
146. Hearings on Admission of Refugees into the United States, supra note 102,
at 63.
147. Id. at 94.
148. Id. at 126-30.
149. Admission of Refugees, Part II, supra note 102, at 217.
150. Sen. Kennedy's S.2751 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 3746 (1978)
(called the Refugee and Displaced Persons Act of 1978) was introduced in the Sen-
ate on March 15, 1978. It represented the broadest and most flexible approach to
refugee admission policy, giving more discretionary authority to the Executive
than the Administration itself was advocating at the time. The refugee definition
The Administration's official response, presented on this last
day of the hearings, was similar to those views advanced earlier
in the hearings by representatives of the State and Justice De-
partments. There was only one significant change: a new numeri-
cal framework was proposed for the "normal flow" admission
category. The Administration suggested that the "normal flow"
refugee admission be set at "up to 50,000", 20,000 to be taken from
the worldwide immigration ceiling plus 30,000 additional admis-
sions. The overall worldwide ceiling including refutgees would ac-
cordingly be raised from 290,000 to 320,000. The Administration
argued that 50,000 refugee allocation represented the actual aver-
age number of refugees admitted in recent years and did not in-
volve any numerical increase.151 Accommodation of the 50,000
within the "normal flow" category would avoid recurring reliance
on emergency procedures which would only be utilized in new,
unforeseen emergency conditions. The Administration endorsed
and extended the "special concern" terminology and supported
an inclusive, flexible interpretation. Congressman Eilberg's bill
had used "special concern" only in reference to emergency admis-
sions. The Administration, however, suggested that priority in al-
locating the 50,000 "normal flow" numbers be given to refugees
who were, in the opinion of the Attorney General, of "special con-
cern" to the United States. In order to assure that allocations
were made in the best interests of the United States, the Admin-
istration agreed to report to Congress on this determination at the
beginning of each fiscal year in order to keep Congress in-
formed.152 At the end of testimony, the Administration expressed
its readiness "to sit down ... and negotiate the points of differ-
ence remaining between [the Executive and Congress].' 153
included an alien "uprooted by catastrophic natural calamity, civil disturbance or
military operations and who is unable to return to his usual place of abode". The
bill allowed for a normal flow of 40,000 "refugees and displaced persons" annually
to be admitted as permanent residents with immigrant visas. Emergency admis-
sions were authorized upon recommendation of the Secretary of State to the At-
torney General, after consultation with the appropriate congressional committee
representatives. The Attorney General could implement an emergency admission
program immediately after consultation with Congress (or within thirty days of
making a request for consultation). Thus, Congress not only would have lacked a
veto power but also would have been statutorily prevented from delaying an emer-
gency program. Emergency admissions had to be "not possible or practical" under
the regular admission procedures, "justified by emergent or humanitarian rea-
sons", or "in the public interest". The parole authority was expanded to allow pa-
role for "humanitarian reasons", rather than further restricted as it was under
Congressman Eilberg's bill. For a detailed discussion of Sen. Kennedy's role re-
garding the Refugee Act and its legislative history see Kennedy, The Refugee Act
of 1980, 15 INT'L MGRArTION REv. 41 (1981).
151. See Admission of Refugees, Part II, supra note 102, at 217.
152. Id. at 218-20.
153. Id. at 220. At approximately the same time as the Administration indi-
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REFUGEE ACT OF 1980
H.R. 2816/S. 643: The Administration's Bill
From November 1978 through February 1979, intensive consulta-
tions occurred between the executive branch and congressional
committee staff aimed at drafting a consensus refugee bill. As a
result of those deliberations and continuing pressure on the Ad-
ministration by Kennedy, 5 4 the Administration's proposed bill
was introduced by Senator Kennedy in the Senate as S. 643,15
and in the House as H.R. 2816156 by Congressman Rodino and
Congresswoman Holtzman. The bi11157 included the universal
nondiscriminatory definition of refugee, which since 1970 had re-
mained the area of greatest consensus in the refugee reform de-
bate. Following the specific intention of the bill's sponsors, the
proposed definition closely paralleled the UN Convention.158
The President's suggestion of up to 50,000 annual admissions as
the "normal flow" had been adopted. These 50,000 "normal flow"
numbers were to be allocated among groups of refugees the Presi-
dent determined to be of "special concern" to the United
States. 5 9
For the first time, however, a second annual admissions cate-
gory was created. The bill provided that in addition to a "normal
flow" of up to 50,000, the President could admit an additional spe-
cific number of groups of refugees of "special concern" to the
United States if that extra number were foreseeable at the begin-
cated to the House Subcommittee its willingness to seriously consider a refugee
bill, Sen. Kennedy found out that he was to assume the Chair of the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee, following Sen. Eastland's resignation. The major road block to
reform in the Senate had, thus, been removed.
154. S. REP. No. 250, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1979) (hereinafter cited as S. REP.
No. 250).
155. S. 643, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 2630 (1979).
156. H.R. 2816, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 10554 (1979).
157. S. REP. No. 256, supra note 154. This bill for the first time not only ad-
dressed the refugee admissions issues but also included a Title Il and Title IV
under what is now the Refugee Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1521-1525 (1980) involving tempo-
rary and transitional assistance to refugees. It became one of the important pur-
poses of the Refugee Act to eliminate discrimination in domestic refugee
assistance programs, to rationalize those programs, and to make them consistent
with a nondiscriminatory refugee admissions policy. Id. (remarks of Sen. Ken-
nedy); see also Id. at 19-37. This article, however, focuses exclusively upon Titles I
and H of the Act, involving the refugee admissions and asylum provisions.
158. HR. 2816, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201, CONG. REc. (1979).
159. Id. at § 207(a) (1).
ning of the year.160 The additional annual admission category was
created in order to accommodate exceptional and continuing cri-
ses, such as the mass exodus of the "boat people" from Southeast
Asia. This category would allow for orderly entry into the United
States without setting an artificially higher number for "normal
flow" refugee admissions, thus obviating the need for third cate-
gory emergency procedures. That third category was created for
unforeseeable admissions "in response to [an] emergency refu-
gee situation" that might arise after the beginning of the fiscal
year and could not be accommodated under the annual admission
procedures. 161 These emergency admissions numbers were also
to be allocated among groups of "special concern" to the United
States.
The bill's consultation requirements were less inclusive than
those contained in Congressman Eilberg's bill of the previous
year. Prior consultation was required to consider only the
number of refugees admitted under the additional admissions and
emergency admissions clauses.162 No consultation was required
to review the conferral of "special concern" status upon particular
groups of refugees or the allocation of numbers among them. The
consultation process itself was not described in detail and the bill
did not contain a provision for a congressional veto.
In the case of refugees admitted under the additional annual
admissions category, the "designated representatives of the Presi-
dent" were required to provide the Judiciary Committee mem-
bers a description of the number "and an explanation of the
reasons for believing that the admission of more than 50,000 refu-
gees of "special concern" to the United States is in the national
interest."163 For consultations under the emergency provisions,
the Judiciary Committee members were to be furnished with "a
description of the unforeseen emergency refugee situation" and
estimates of the number of prospective refugees and the cost of
their resettlement.164
Admissions under the additional annual admissions category
had to be justified by humanitarian concerns or be "otherwise in
the national interest." Emergency admissions had to be justified
by "grave humanitarian concerns" or be "otherwise in the na-
tional interest."165 The bill allowed for waivers of certain grounds
of excludability, including most significantly the public charge
160. Id. at § 207(a) (2).
161. Id. at § 208(a).
162. Id. at §§ 207(a)(2) and 208(a).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at §§ 207(a) (2) and 208(a).
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and literacy requirements of the law.
166
Some of the changes in section 243(h)167 proposed in prior
bills168 were incorporated into the new bill. These authorized the
Attorney General to withhold "the deportation or return of any
alien to any country where such alien's life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion." 169 Thus, the
protections 'of this section were extended to apply in exclusion as
well as deportation hearings. The proposed section 243(h) also
enlarged the bases of persecution to include "nationality and
membership in a particular social group." Both of these repre-
sented movements towards consonance with the UN Convention.
Unlike the earlier version of Congressman Eilberg's bill, no for-
mal limitations were placed on the parole authority. In the sec-
tion-by-section analysis of the Administration's bill, however, it
was clearly stated that this authority could be used for refugee
admissions only if there were "compelling reasons in the public
interest related to the individual refugee."l7 0
House and Senate Judiciary Committee Consideration of the Bill
H.R. 2816 was referred to the Subcommittee on Immigration,
Citizenship and International Law which held hearings on the bill
in May of 1979.171 In the Senate, a hearing on S. 643 was held
before the Committee on the Judiciary on March 14, 1979.172
Much of the testimony heard during that hearing was similar to
testimony offered during House Subcommittee hearings.17 3 Con-
gressional consideration of this bill in House Subcommittee and
Senate Judiciary Committee hearings focused on five areas: the
refugee definition, allocation of refugee numbers to those of "spe-
166. Id. at §§ 207(a) (3), 207(b) (2), 209 and 210(b).
167. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1965) (amended 1980).
168. See note 144 supra and accompanying text.
169. H.R. 2816, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 12376 (1979).
170. 125 CONG. REC. 2633 (1979).
171. Hearings on H.R. 2816, supra note 1.
172. Hearings on S. 643, supra note 105. Note that the Senate Subcommittee on
Immigration had been abolished by Sen. Kennedy when he assumed the Chair of
the Committee on the Judiciary. See also note 153 supra.
173. The Senate hearings were briefer and involved less controversy. The ad-
ministration's bill, from the time it was first introduced in the Senate through floor
amendments in September of 1979, underwent a simpler and smoother process
than its companion bill in the House. See notes 150, 153-54 supra for Sen. Ken-
nedy's role in advancing the legislation.
cial concern," section 243(h), the need for a statutory asylum pro-
vision, and the need for a consultation procedure.
The intent to implement a broad, nondiscriminatory refugee
policy embodied in the new UN definition was evidenced during
committee and subcommittee hearings in both houses. In testify-
ing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Ambassador Clark
criticized the current law's treatment of refugee problems as "in-
adequate, discriminatory and totally out of touch with today's
needs." 174 Describing the diversity of the refugee population he
stated, "[w]hile the plight of the boat people in Southeast Asia
presents today's most dramatic case, it must not blind us to the
hardships of refugees fleeing oppression and persecution in East-
ern Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America."175 In
other parts of the hearing record, the new refugee definition was
lauded as installing "a more universal standard based on
uprootedness rather than ideology."1
76
While a more general agreement was apparent, Congress con-
tinued to focus on monitoring the Executive's power in refugee
admissions as it had in earlier hearings. During the House Sub-
committee hearing, one major change recommended was an ex-
plicit statement of the bill's purpose "to implement and/or
reinforce the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees."177 In addition, witnesses from Amnesty International
and other organizations wanted explicit inclusion of displaced
persons, political detainees and in general those persons still
within their country of nationality within the definition of "'refu-
gee."178 Administration witnesses made it clear that the new ref-
ugee definition did not, as in former law, require third country
processing of refugee applications. There was nothing, however,
in the new bill specifically allowing for processing within the per-
secuting country. The reference to displaced persons contained
in some prior bills, particularly S. 3751,179 did not appear in the
Administration's bill. Amnesty International testified:
Unless the definition of "refugee" is expanded, it appears that ...
[these] political prisoners, and those displaced from their homes by civil
strife will not be eligible for admission to the United States as refugees
... [gjiven the failure of the Hemispheric Parole Program to even scratch
the surface of the political refugee problem in Argentina and other coun-
tries of Latin America, Amnesty has great fears that prisoners of con-
science will be merely ignored unless a particular individual is seen to be
174. Hearing on S. 643, supra note 90, at 9.
175. Id. at 11.
176. Id. at 187, quoting Washington Post, March 12, 1979.
177. Hearings on H.R. 2816, supra note 1, at 168 (testimony of A. Whitney Ells-
worth and Hurst Hannum, Amnesty International).
178. Id. at 169.
179. See note 150 supra.
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relevant to the political context of the moment and therefore becomes a
"compelling" case whose admission is "required".180
Witnesses also focused upon practical problems resulting from
the inaccessibility of INS processing centers:
The definitions.., don't now require that a person make his applica-
tion within a third country, but in fact it would be impossible for a person
in a country where he is suffering persecution, to be pre-cleared, screened
or processed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.181
Another major controversial provision of the bill was allocations
of refugee numbers to those of "special concern." Some wit-
nesses expressed the fear that this represented a return to ideo-
logical restrictions. 8 2 This suspicion was reinforced by official
pronouncements. The section-by-section analysis, for example
stated, "[in recent years the refugees who have been a special
concern to the United States have included Cubans, Soviets, East-
ern Europeans and Indochinese."183 In attempting to clarify this
language, Ambassador Clark referred to traditional considerations
for refugee admissions, testifying that special attention would be
paid to "whether the refugees have cultural, historical or espe-
cially family ties to the United States" or "[w]hether we have a
special responsibility because of previous U.S. political involve-
ment with the refugee or his country of origin."184 At the same
time Ambassador Clark explained that the factors he had listed
were "simply a summarization of what we've been doing, rather
than anything written in stone in terms of projections of the
future."185
Despite these assurances, subcommittee members and nongov-
ernmental organizations thought that even to suggest that the
United States would limit its assistance to refugees of "special
concern" would undercut the universal humanitarian standards of
the Refugee Act. Witnesses recommended that "special need,
and not special political concern, should be the dominant crite-
180. Hearings on H.R. 2816, supra note 1, at 171.
181. Id. at 187 (testimony of David Carliner, American Civil Liberties Union).
182. See Id. at 182 (dialogue between Congresswoman Holtzman and Mr. Ells-
worth of Amnesty International in which "special concern" was seen as referring
to "geopolitical concerns" and a return to "the national origins policy in our immi-
gration law").
183. See note 170 supra.
184. Hearings on H.R. 2816, supra note 1, at 24-25.
185. Id. at 26.
rion."186 It was suggested that an important factor to be consid-
ered in determining "special concern" was whether refugees were
"from a country wherein there exists a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights".
87
While dissatisfied with the "special concern" terminology, sev-
eral members of Congress nonetheless desired statutorily articu-
lated standards. As in earlier hearings, members of Congress
insisted upon the need for statutory devices to control the exer-
cise of executive discretion. Chairwoman Holtzman noted:
I want you to focus on the special concern provisions. I do not think that
it is sufficient to come here and say that special concern is a terrible provi-
sion because it will provide certain limitations when in fact by selecting
50,000 people out of thirteen million refugees you have to apply some kind
of standards and limitations.
The question is whether this discretion will be given completely to any
President... or whether standards will be set .... I agree with you that
the decisions with regard to refugees have essentially been political deci-
sions but I don't think you solve that problem even if you take the term
"special concern" out of the statute.188
The same mistrust of the Executive's use of politically moti-
vated selection criteria that incited controversy over the "special
concern" terminology reinforced earlier demands for universal
statutory asylum procedures and mandatory requirements in the
section 243(h) provisions.189 Thus, the Administration's proposed
section 243(h) provision was criticized for allowing the discretion-
ary withholding of the return of the alien, "[dlespite the
mandatory nature of the United States' obligations under interna-
tional law."'190 Section 243(h) procedures were characterized as
"woefully inadequate."191 Even amended to reflect this concern,
section 243(h) was not to be substituted for a statutory asylum
provision which would establish the right to apply for asylum ei-
ther within or outside the United States:
It seems that it shouldn't be necessary to claim asylum through a proce-
dure designed to allow one to withhold deportation under section 243(h).
Those are not necessarily the same questions. There may be many rea-
sons to withhold deportation of an alien, but asylum procedures should be
separate. Although the right of asylum has been regarded as an historic
tenet of American political policy, it has not been set forth in any statu-
tory provision .... In as much as it, in fact, has been woven into the
fabric of American history and has achieved international acceptance as a
policy in the declarations of the United Nations, it seems appropriate to
reinforce that policy by stating it explicitly as a purpose of the "Refugee
186. Id. at 177 (testimony of Whitney Ellsworth and Hurst Hannum, Amnesty
International).
187. Id. at 174.
188. Id. at 69.
189. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1980).
190. Id. at 193.
191. Id. at 169.
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Act of 1979".192
The congressional focus upon the dimensions of its role in the
refugee admission process was again reflected in discussions on
the proposed consultation provisions. This was especially the
case since the veto provisions of the former bills had been elimi-
nated, and there was no explicit description of the consultation
process as had appeared in Congressman Eilberg's H.R. 2816.193
Members of the House Subcommittee felt that the consultation
provision's informality and nonspecificity would discourage "good
faith, real efforts" to obtain congressional input into presidential
decisions to raise the numerical limit over 50,000.194 House mem-
bers also were critical about their lack of participation in deci-
sions allocating numbers and their inability to influence changes
after the beginning of the fiscal year. The Executive's decision to
raise the numbers of admissions was qualified only by the re-
quired determination that the increase was "in the national inter-
est" or justified by "humanitarian" concerns. Administration
witnesses admitted that these terms created no discernable lim-
its, since they were impossible to define.9 5
In response to these objections Attorney General Bell, repre-
senting the Administration, attempted to define the implicit con-
gressional control in the statutory consultation process:
This morning we are in the process of making legislative history and I will
give you my view of what the consultation process means, or ought to
mean. There are legal writings on this approach. I would treat the consul-
tation process as a report-and-wait provision. Report-and-wait provisions
are prone to the law of legislative veto. The executive department and the
President, by consulting, reports to the Congress what he wants to do and
gives it a certain period of time within which not only to consult but to act,
if it wishes to act. You might say we don't agree with that; we want to
block that. But I wouldn't make it a set number of days in which the Con-
gress has to act. That's beyond the spirit of a good faith consultation.
However, the period of consultation ought to be long enough for the Con-
gress to decide whether or not it agrees.
1 9 6
Despite this statement by the Attorney General, giving Con-
gress an implicit veto power, the Administration insisted upon
flexibility and undefined statutory language. Thus, while the 're-
port-and-wait" provision was written into the legislative history,
192. Id. at 184-86.
193. See notes 127-28 supra and accompanying text.
194. Hearings on H.R. 2816, supra note 1, at 65.
195. Id. at 25.
196. Id. at 24.
the Administration did not want it written into the law.197 But
when the suggestion was made to write in detailed description
and definition of consultation, as had appeared in the earlier
Eilberg bill, the Attorney General had no objection.198
The House and Senate Reports
Following these committee and subcommittee hearings, amend-
ments to the original Administration bill were incorporated into
the House'99 and Senate reports2 0O on the Refugee Act of 1979.
The House and Senate reports reflected different standpoints in
the historic struggle over control between executive and congres-
sional forces. The provisions of the House bill attempted to trans-
fer significant power in refugee admission to Congress. Senate
leaders, on the other hand, wanted to maintain the flexibility of
the admission procedures and not compromise that flexibility by
imposing rigid congressional control mechanisms. 20'
There was consistent agreement, however, on certain princi-
ples: to strengthen and emphasize the humanitarian and nondis-
criminatory underpinnings of the legislation, and further buttress
the asylum provisions. 202
The refugee definition reported out by the House Committee
contained an additional Section "B", specifically referring to those
persecuted or threatened with persecution in their own coun-
try.2 0 3 While the language of the definition did not literally cover
them, the Committee's intent was to provide for detainees and
political prisoners. According to the Committee report:
197. Id. at 30.
198. Id. at 64-65.
199. H. REP. No. 608, supra note 10; Bill introduced in the House of Representa-
tives as H.R. 2816, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 12376 (1979).
200. S. REP. No. 256, supra note 157; Bill introduced in the Senate as S.643, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 12021 (1979).
201. The Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, under the leadership of Sen. Ken-
nedy, had advocated a greater executive branch role in the refugee admission pro-
cess. See note 150 supra.
202. In the House, subcommittee mark-up on HR. 2816 took place on August 1,
1979, during which Congresswoman Holtzman offered an amendment in the nature
of a substitute making significant changes in the original legislation. After a single
subcommittee amendment was approved, the bill with amendments was referred
to the full committee mark-up on September 13 and 19, 1979. The committee or-
dered the bill favorably reported to the House with an amendment by a vote of 20-
6. When H.R. 2816 was reported out of the full House committee important
changes had been made reflecting many of the areas of discussion during subcom-
mittee hearings in May. See H.R. REP. No. 608, supra note 10, at 7.
On the senate side, the Judiciary Committee, meeting in open session on July
10, 1979, considered and amended the bill. See S. REP. No. 258, supra note 157, at 3.
203. The proposed § 101(a) (42) (B) covered "any person who is within the coun-
try of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality,
within the country in which such person is habitually residing".
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While these individuals are not covered by the U.N. Convention, the Com-
mittee believes it is essential in the definition to give the United States
sufficient flexibility to respond to situations involving political or religious
dissidents and detainees throughout the world.
204
In explaining the rationale of the provision the Committee re-
ferred to Chilean and Cuban prisoners brought directly to the
United States and to the hemispheric parole programs for prison-
ers in Argentina and other Latin American countries, as well as to
the evacuation of Saigon in 1975. Members noted that coverage
for these "refugees" was noncontroversial; Administration wit-
nesses had indicated their intention to encompass detainees in
the original refugee definition written in S. 643/H.R. 2816.205
The Senate Committee bill specifically amended the definition
of refugee to include "displaced persons." This was done "to in-
sure maximum flexibility in responding to the needs of the home-
less who are of concern to the United States."20 6
In the House Committee's version a further amendment was
added to the refugee definition to exclude from eligibility for refu-
gee status those who had engaged in the persecution of others.
This was viewed as consistent with the UN Protocol which by its
terms does not apply to those who "committed a crime against
peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity."
207
The amendment was also consistent with recently enacted leg-
islation allowing for the deportation of Nazi war criminals, 208 as
well as provisions in earlier refugee reform proposals.
209
The annual and emergency admission provisions were changed
in several important respects from the original, Administration
version. For example, in the Administration's bill the allocation
determination to refugee groups of "special concern" was exclu-
sively within the President's authority, whereas, the House Com-
204. H.R. REP. No. 608 supra note 10.
205. Id.
206. S. REP. No. 256, supra note 157, at 4. As in the House version, Part A of the
new definition referred to those outside the persecuting country and conformed to
the UN Protocol. The Senate Committee's Part B referred to "any person who has
been displaced by military or civil disturbance or uprooted because of arbitrary
detention of the threat of persecution, and who is unable to to return to his usual
place of abode".
207. ILR. 2816, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201(a) (42), 125 CONG. REC. 12367 (1979); 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (1980). H.R. REP. No. 608, supra note 10, at 10.
208. Act of October 30, 1978, Pub. L No. 95-549, 92 Stat. 2065 (1978).
209. See, e.g., H.R. 7175, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 243(h) 123 CONG. REc. 14648
(1977).
mittee bill required that the allocation of refugee admissions to
those of "special humanitarian concern" be based on a determina-
tion made by the President, after consultation with Congress.210
In effect, the House Committee bill sought to make consultation
mandatory as to allocations of refugee admissions in all cases,
not just with respect to numbers of refugees when such numbers
exceeded 50,000.
While amendments made by the House Committee reinforced
the role of Congress, many of the Senate changes increased the
Executive's power. One example increasing the Executive's
power was a change in the provisions for increased refugee ad-
missions. In an added provision for "periodic discussions,"211 the
Senate bill attempted to cover the situation in which after the ini-
tial consultation and the submission of the budget request, the
President became aware of the need for additional refugee admis-
sions. He could then "conduct additional consultations regarding
possible adjustments of estimated normal flow numbers."212 The
provision thus created additional flexibility in the admission pro-
cess by giving the President a second opportunity to increase the
number of annual refugee admissions.
The House and Senate Committee versions of the emergency
admission provisions were essentially the same, adopting the Ad-
ministration's bill language, with the exception that the House re-
port "limited [emergency admissions] to circumstances which are
unforeseen prior to the beginning of the fiscal year."213 The
House Committee noted that, while it was not adopting a rigid nu-
merical ceiling on emergency admissions, "the Committee
amendment does limit the President's authority to admit refugees
under this provision to a maximum twelve month period."214 The
Senate bill contained no similar time restriction but rather the
Senate report described the need for unfettered emergency pow-
ers. "In such emergency circumstances the consultation process
210. H.R. 2816, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 207(b), 125 CoNG. RE C. 12367 (1979);
adopted in the Refugee Act at 8 U.S.C. § 1157(b) (1980). The language of the Sen-
ate Committee's bill did not require consultation as to allocations.
The Senate report, however, stated "[t]he admission numbers will be allocated
to groups of refugees of special concern to the United States" as determined by
the President in consultation with Congress". S. REP. No. 256, supra note 185, at 5.
211. "[T] here shall be periodic discussions between designated representatives
of the President and members of Committee on the Judiciary regarding the pro-
gress of refugee admissions and the possible need for adjustment in the allocation
of admissions among groups or classes of refugees." S. 643, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 207(a) (1), 125 CONG. REC. 12021 (1979) (similar provision in Refugee Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1157(d) (1980)).
212. S. REP. No. 256, supra note 157, at 5.
213. H.R. 2816, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 207(a)-(b), 125 CONG. REC. 12367 (1979).
214. H.R. REP. No., supra note 157, at 12.
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... should be viewed as urgent by both the executive and legisla-
tive branches."
215
The House Committee sought to limit further the Executive's
authority to admit refugees in emergencies by adopting Congress-
man Eilberg's proposed restriction on the use of the parole au-
thority for refugee admissions, 216 prohibiting its use for refugees
unless specific justification could be found for the particular alien.
By contrast, the Senate version made no statutory change in the
parole authority. While the section-by-section analysis in the
Senate report expressed the Committee's intent to limit the use
of parole for refugee admissions, it still allowed for the parole of
refugees by group.
Once the bill takes effect, however, the Attorney General does not antici-
pate using this authority with respect to refugees unless he determines
that compelling reasons in the public interest related to individual or
groups of refugees require that they be paroled into the United States,
rather than admitted in accordance with ... [the annual and emergency
admission provisions in the bill].217
In the House Committee's version, the consultation provision
was strengthened in several respects. The House report stated
"the Committee cannot over-emphasize the importance it at-
taches to consultation."2 18 As noted above, a consultation require-
ment was added for allocations decisions.219 The Committee's bill
also required the President to designate a cabinet member
220 to
participate in consultations with the Judiciary Committee. The
Committee incorporated the definition of the consultation process
contained in Congressman Eilberg's former H.R. 7175,221 setting
forth information that had to be submitted as part of the consulta-
tion process, including descriptions of resettlement plans and
"the anticipated economic, social and demographic impact of the
admission of the refugees in question."2 2 The House Committee
report went on to state that the former, nonstatutory consultation
process, involving consultation with the Chairpersons of the full
215. S. REP. No., supra note 150, at 10.
216. See note 115 supra and accompanying text. See 8 U.S.C. § 1253(d) (5) (B)
(1980).
217. S. REP. No. 256, supra note 157, at 17.
218. M-R. REP. No. 608, supra note 10, at 14.
219. See note 210 supra and accompanying text.
220. H.R. 2816, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 207(e) 125 CONG. REC. 12367 (1979) (simi-
lar provision in Refugee Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1157(e) (1980)).
221. See note 127 supra.
222. H.R. 2816, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 207(e) 125 CON6. REC. 12367 (1979) (simi-
lar provision in Refugee Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1157(e) (1980)).
House and Senate Judiciary Committees, and the House Subcom-
mittees on Immigration, Refugees and International Law, as well
as ranking minority members of the committees and subcommit-
tees, would be followed. According to the House Committee re-
port, the information required in the defined consultation
provision would be submitted by the Executive at least two weeks
in advance; the consultation process itself would not take longer
than fifteen to twenty days.223 The House report stated the Com-
mittee members' belief that "the Administration cannot move
ahead to admit additional refugees after consultation, until some
response has been received from the consultative members."224
The report referred to Attorney General Bell's testimony regard-
ing the implicit "report-and-wait" requirement as support for its
position.225
In the Senate Committee's version, the consultation process
was defined similarly, with a description of the "personal contact"
required between the Executive and the Judiciary Committees.226
Generally, however, the Senate version and report proposed a
more flexible consultation process. Rather than stressing the "re-
port-and-wait" provision, the Senate report emphasized the intent
of the Committee members not to create "a statutory definition of
what action is required of the Judiciary Committee of Congress to
conclude the consultation process." 227
The discussions during the hearings regarding the "special con-
cern" terminology resulted in important amendments. The House
Committee's bill changed the term "special concern" to "special
humanitarian concern" 228 as the standard to be applied in deter-
mining allocation of refugee admissions. By making this change
"the Committee intend[ed] to emphasize that the plight of the
refugees themselves as opposed to national origins or political
considerations should be paramount in determining which refu-
gees are to be admitted to the United States.229 At the same time,
the need for flexibility was reiterated:
The legislation does not-and cannot-further define this phrase. The
Committee believes that any attempt to do so would unnecessarily restrict
future public policy decisions. The Committee recognizes that determin-
ing which refugees are of "special humanitarian concern" to the United
States will be a matter to be considered, debated and decided at the time
223. H.R. REP. No. 608, supra note 10, at 14-15.
224. Id. at 15.
225. Id. See note 196 supra and accompanying text.
226. S.643, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 207(a) (2), 125 CONG. REc. 12021 (1979).
227. S. REP. No. 256, supra note 157, at 7.
228. H.R. 2816, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 207(a) 125 CONG. REc. 12367 (1979) (same
language in Refugee Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a) (1980)).
229. H.R. REP. No. 608, supra note 10, at 13.
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refugee situations develop.
230
In enumerating the factors that could be considered in utilizing
the "special humanitarian concern" standard, the House Commit-
tee had been influenced by the Amnesty International testi-
mony.2 31 The Committee emphasized humanitarian
considerations, placing the-plight of the refugees and the pattern
of human rights violations in the country of origin as the first fac-
tors to be weighed.
232
Although the term "special concern" was retained in the Senate
Committee version as a selection guide in refugee admissions, in
defining this term the Senate report made some significant
changes which emphasized the humanitarian factors (from the
original section-by-section analysis). As in the House report,
human rights concerns were stressed. When setting out the
guidelines from the past for selecting refugees of the "special con-
cern," the report referred not only to admissions from countries
where the United States had had "historic, cultural, or direct in-
volvement" but also noted that refugees had been admitted "to
promote family reunion; to respond to human rights concerns em-
bodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; to fulfill for-
eign policy interests; and when no other country [had] responded
to the needs of the homeless .. ,"233 The report underscored the
need for a broader, more inclusive refugee policy. Thus, when
giving past examples of countries from which the United States
had accepted refugees of "special concern," the report added to
those listed in the section-by-section analysis of the original
bil1,234 including those "from the Middle East, Uganda, Lebanon,
Latin America and elsewhere." 235
In response to testimony at the hearing advocating the protec-
tions of a statutory asylum scheme,236 both the House and Senate
Committee's versions provided a statutory mandate for the Attor-
ney General to establish asylum procedures "for an alien physi-
cally present in the United States or at a land border or port of
230. Id. at 13.
231. See note 186 supra and accompanying text.
232. HLR. REP. No. 508, supra note 8, at 13-14.
233. Id. at 15.
234. See note 170 supra.
235. H. REP. No. 608, supra note 10, at 15.
236. See notes 189-192 supra and accompanying text
entry, irrespective of such alien's status... "237 The House
Committee bill authorized the Attorney General to grant asylum
if he determined that the alien was a refugee within the meaning
of the bill.238 At the same time, the House and Senate Commit-
tees eliminated the discretionary element in the withholding pro-
vision making its provisions mandatory.23 9 The House bill created
certain specified exceptions to the withholding provisions, but
these were all explained as consistent with the UN Convention.240
House and Senate Floor Action
H.R. 2816 was discussed on the floor of the House of Represent-
atives on December 13, 1979, and further debated and amended a
week later.241 The Senate bill, S. 643 as amended and reported
out of the Senate Judiciary Committee, was debated and
amended on the floor of the Senate on September 6, 1979.242
The formal introduction of the bill in the House, debate and
amendments, occurred on December 20, 1979.243 Debate centered
on congressional control over refugee admissions numbers and
strengthening of the consultation process. The liberalization that
had been achieved in committee on the refugee admission evoked
opposition on the House floor. The members supported a nondis-
criminatory policy. At the same time, they were fearful that the
effect would be to enact an expansive admission policy not tem-
pered by ascertainable numerical limits nor by meaningful con-
gressional control over the action of the Executive. These
perennial fears had not been allayed. The first floor amendments,
introduced by Congressman Fascell,24 4 modified the House Com-
237. H.R. 2816, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 208(a), 125 CONG. REC. 12367 (1979); S.643,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 207(b), 125 CONG. REC. 12021 (1979).
238. H.R. 2816, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 208(a) 125 CONG. REC. 12367 (1979) (simi-
lar provision in Refugee Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1980)). The House report stated,
"The Committee wishes to insure a fair and workable asylum policy which is con-
sistent with this country's tradition of welcoming the oppressed of other nations
and with our obligations under international law... The Committee intends to
monitor closely the Attorney General's implementation of the section so as to in-
sure the rights of those it seeks to protect". H.R. REP. No. 608, supra note 10, at 17-
18. The Senate Committee bill, § 207(b), made the grant of asylum mandatory
upon the appropriate showing, whereas the House version left the decision to
grant asylum within the Attorney General's discretion. S. REP. No. 256, supra note
157, at 8-9.
239. H.R. 2816, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 203(e), 125 CONG. REC. 12367 (1979); S.643,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 203(e), 125 CONG. REC. 12021 (1979).
240. H.R. REP. No. 608, supra note 10, at 16.
241. 125 CONG. REC. 11965 (1979).
242. See note 200 supra.
243. See note 199 supra.
244. Id. at 12369. Two other amendments offered by Congressman Fascell in-
volved the conduct of resettlement assistance programs. Another established a
new Title IV of H.R. 2816. It provided federal reimbursement to the states for so-
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mittee's amended refugee definition which allowed those still
within the persecuting country to qualify as refugees. Congress-
man Fascell stated his view that the Committee change went be-
yond the UN definition and potentially opened the numerical
floodgates. Under Congressman Fascell's amendment, those still
within the persecuting country could only qualify for refugee sta-
tus after being specially designated by the President in consulta-
tion with Congress. 2
45
An amendment to the admissions provision of the legislation
was introduced by Congressman Butler. This "sunset clause"
amendment 246 provided that after 1982 the "normal flow" refugee
admissions be returned to 17,400, the number of refugee admis-
sions under the current provisions of section 203 (a) (7) of the
INA.247 Congressman Sessenbrenner, in approving this amend-
ment, made two major criticisms of the bill: first, refugee policy
was left uncoordinated with the legal immigration policy for non-
refugee immigrants; second, the legislation would be passed prior
to the report of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refu-
gee Policy. 24 8 By sunsetting the increased flow of refugees at the
end of fiscal year 1982, "it will give Congress an opportunity to re-
view the report of that Commission and its recommendations and
hopefully enact a permanent policy relating to both refugees and
nonrefugee [sic] immigrants." 249 Both amendments, accepted by
cial services provided asylum applicants who had submitted applications prior to
November 1, 1979. While not specifically limited to Haitian asylum applicants the
amendment was aimed at providing assistance to southern Florida for the costs
resulting from the influx of these refugees.
All of Congressman Fascell's amendments were accepted by the House, along
with an amendment offered by Congressman Danielson involving the time limits
for reimbursement for certain types of domestic assistance to refugees. See REFU-
GEE PROGR",S AND POLIcIEs, supra note 10, at 49-50.
245. As to refugees still within the persecuting country, Congressman Fascell's
amendment would allow them to be admitted "in such special circumstances as
the President after appropriate consultation ... may specify". 125 CONG. REC.
H12369 (1979). This amendment was incorporated into the Refugee Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a) (42) (B) (1980).
246. 125 CONG. REC. 12369 (1979).
247. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (7) (1952) repealed by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(c) (7) (1980).
248. Act of October 5, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-412, 92 Stat. 907 (1979) established the
Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy whose mandate was to
study and evaluate "existing laws, policies and procedures governing the admis-
sion of immigrants and refugees to the United States and to make such adminis-
trative and legislative recommendations to the President and the Congress as are
appropriate". The deadline for the final report was originally Sept. 30, 1980, but
was extended to March 1, 1981.
249. 125 CONG. REC. H12370 (1979).
Congresswoman Holtzman, were adopted.
Further amendments introduced on the House floor were
designed to strengthen the consultation mechanism. An amend-
ment, introduced by Congressman Hyde, provided for "a hearing
to review the proposal to increase refugee admissions" to be held
"unless public disclosure of the details of the proposal would
jeopardize the lives or safety of individuals." Such a hearing was
to take place in the case of decisions to increase the "normal
flow" above 50,000 (the second annual admissions category), as
well as for emergency admissions "to the extent that time and the
nature of the emergency refugee situation permit."25 0 The
amendment was adopted, unopposed by Congresswoman Holtz-
man. "[T] here is no substitute for public scrutiny, public disclo-
sure, public debate on an issue of such importance, as the
admission of refugees to the United States."251
The most controversial amendment was offered by Congress-
man Moorehead. Characterizing the consultation language as "il-
lusory," Congressman Moorehead resurrected the congressional
veto from earlier proposed refugee reform bils.252 The amend-
ment provided that a presidential determination to increase the
number of refugees admitted above 50,000 would not go into effect
if at the end of fifteen days of continuous session either house
passed a resolution stating in substance that it did not approve
the determination. The veto would not apply to an emergency de-
termination but would apply only to a foreseeable influx of refu-
gees. The Congressman emphasized that the veto provision
would not affect emergency admissions where there was immedi-
ate danger to human lives. 253 Congressman Fish, in supporting
the amendment, emphasized just how narrow the scope of the
amendment was:
Several months before the beginning of the fiscal year, the President
would make a determination if he wishes to ask for the admission of refu-
gees in addition to the 50,000 normal flow. That is where the one-House
veto comes into play. It affects no other part of the admission process, or,
I might add, of the allocation process, which is also subject to consultation
with the Committees on the Judiciary ... I think when we read this
amendment, together with the Sunset Amendment that has been accepted
today and the enlarged consultation amendment, that we are restoring
control over admission of aliens to the Congress, the branch of govern-
ment that is given sole control over immigration by the Constitution.
25 4
250. Id. at 12371. This amendment was incorporated into the Refugee Act in
§ 207(d) (3) (B).
251. Id.
252. See discussion of Congressman Eilberg's H.R. 3056 and H.R. 7175 supra
note 118 and accompanying text.
253. 125 CONG. REC. 12372-73 (1979).
254. Id. at 12374-75.
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The amendment, although opposed by Congresswoman Holtz-
man, was also adopted in the bill as passed. The amended com-
mittee bill was then passed on a roll call vote of 328 to 47 and was
sent to conference committee.
255
On the floor of the Senate, four amendments were offered by
Senator Huddleston, "the only discernable opponent of the com-
mittee-reported bill."256 However, the differences among Senator
Huddleston and Senator Kennedy, the other committee sponsors,
and the Administration had been resolved prior to floor debate.
257
As a result, the amendments were all accepted without opposi-
tion. As in the case of the amendments offered on the House
floor, the major focus of these amendments was to strengthen
congressional control and to narrow the scope of the Executive's
discretionary powers. The first amendment, for example, was
similar to that offered by Congressman Hyde.2 58 It required the
Judiciary Committees to hold public hearings on a proposal to in-
crease the "normal flow" above 50,000. In addition, it required the
submission of a report to Congress within thirty days after the
hearing. In offering the amendment, Senator Huddleston stated:
"[m] embers of Congress will have the opportunity to either agree
or disagree with the proposal at the hearings ... ,I believe that
this amendment will firmly establish the principle that Congress,
as a whole, will establish immigration policy for the country in an
informed and open manner."25 9 Senator Huddleston's second
amendment substituted the term "special responsibility" for "spe-
cial concern" as a selection criteria to be used by the Executive in
determinations to raise the "normal flow" of refugee admissions
above 50,000. He stated that the term would have a narrow mean-
ing, encompassing those with a "close social, economic, cultural
or political association that is not shared with other groups of
refugees." 260
Senator Huddleston's third amendment was a "sunset provi-
ion,"261 providing that after 1982, the number of refugees admit-
255. Id. at 12410. This passage was vacated, and the House passed S. 643
amended with the House-passed language of H.R. 2816 policies, See REFUGEE PRO-
GRAMS AND POLICIES, supra note 98, at 10.
256. REFUGEE PROGRAMS AND POLIcIES supra note 98, at 47-48.
257. Id.
258. See note 250 supra.
259. 125 CONG. REC. 12020 (1979).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 12021. In light of the congressional intent to emphasize humanita-
ted "be set exclusively by the consultation process." 262 Finally,
the Senator further amended the '"purpose section" of the Act to
state that the new immigration quotas established by this Act
should be subjected to a timely review and reevaluation taking
into consideration the recommendations of the Select Commis-
sion. Senator Huddleston stated that the amendment was being
added in order to assure that the Select Commission could carry
out its mission and to dramatize the fact that "the increased
quota [was] highly controversial."2 63
The Conference Report
In its statement of purpose, the final Conference report on the
bill adopted the basic structure of the Senate version except that
the term "special humanitarian concern" was substituted for
"special concern."264 It expressed the purpose of the bill in terms
of "the historic policy of the United States to respond to the ur-
gent needs of persons subject to persecution in their homelands"
and provided that "the objectives of [the] Act [were] to provide a
permanent and systematic procedure for the admission to this
country of refugees ... and to provide comprehensive and uni-
form provisions for the effective resettlement and absorption of
those refugees who [were] admitted."265
Definition of Refugee
The conference committee adopted the House provision incor-
porating the UN definition, as well as Congressman Fascell's
amendment including presidentially specified persons within
their own countries who are persecuted or fear persecution.266
Both House and Senate sponsors emphasized that the purpose
was to create a nondiscriminatory definition of refugee and to
make United States law conform to the UN Convention.267 The
provision for "presidentially specified persons" was meant to
cover "displaced persons" within their own country in order to
rian concerns in the legislation, it is significant that this amendment was not
adopted by the Conference Committee.
262. For similar House amendment, see note 246 supra, and the Refugee Act, 8
U.S.C. § 1157(a) (2) (1980).
263. 125 CoNG. REC. 12021 (1979).
264. S. REP. No. 590, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980) (hereinafter cited as S. REP.
No. 590).
265. Id. at 19. 8 U.S.C. § 1521 n. on Congressional Policies and Objectives
(1980). For a section-by-section discussion of the Refugee Act see 57 LNTERPRETER
RELEASES 133-39 (1980); Anker, The Refugee Act of 1980, 9 I-MGRATION NEwsLET-
TER 2 (1980).
266. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (1980).
267. S. REP. No. 590, supra note 264, at 19.
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provide for situations such as the 1975 evacuation of Saigon,
"state of seige" detainees in Argentina, and Cuban political pris-
oners. Specifically excluded were persons within their own coun-
try who themselves engaged in persecution.268
The bar to refugees who were firmly resettled, which had been
included in refugee reform bills since 1970, was retained in the
Conference bill. The conferees stated their expectation that regu-
lations regarding firm resettlement would be promulgated by the
Attorney General in consultation with the Secretary of State.
They further directed the Attorney General to submit periodic re-
ports detailing those refugees "denied admission under the
Tirnly resettled' criteria or who are admitted to the United States
after having travelled to another country for resettlement."269
Admission of Refugees
The Conference Committee report provides for 50,000 refugee
admissions annually through 1982 as the "normal flow" refugee
admissions, with allocations to be determined by the President in
consultation with Congress. If there is an anticipated need for
more than 50,000 admissions at the beginning of any year through
1982, the additional number and allocation would be determined
during the consultation process.270
The Senate's sunset provision was adopted; it provided that,
after fiscal year 1982, the number and nature of admissions would
be determined exclusively through the consultation process with-
out a predetermined "normal flow."271
These admissions numbers were to be allocated principally
among "refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United
States." 272 The conferees thus adopted the House language em-
phasizing the intended humanitarian basis of refugee admission
policy. All reference to "special concern" and "special responsi-
bility" had been eliminated.
The refugee admission mechanism created in the bill was in-
tended to be the exclusive means for mass refugee admissions,
and the parole authority was accordingly modified. The Confer-
268. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (1980).
269. S. REP. No. 590, supra note 264, at 19.
270. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a) (1) (1980).
271. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a) (2) (1980).
272. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a) (3) (1980).
ence adopted the House amendment limiting the use of parole for
individual refugees and requiring a determination that "compel-
ling reasons in the public interest... require that the alien be
paroled into the United States rather than be admitted as a refu-
gee."273 The Conference provided for a sixty-day delay in the ef-
fective date of these parole provisions in order "to make it clear
that existing refugee parole programs will continue until a consul-
tation on future refugee admission programs is held under the
terms of this legislation."274
For refugees admitted under either the annual or emergency
procedures, the bill creates a new conditional status of refugee,
allowing for adjustment of status after one year (as opposed to
two years as provided in the House bill).275 The conferees stated
that this new "refugee" admission status was intended to be dif-
ferent from either the present "conditional entry" or "parolee"
status. 276
Senator Kennedy, later expanding upon the Conference report
on the Senate floor, explained that it was the conferees' intent
that aliens in countries outside the United States, qualified as ref-
ugees and seeking to be admitted to the United States, need not
apply exclusively to an immigration officer. He considered one of
the most important effects of the new Act that applications for
refugee status could be processed by consular officers in Ameri-
can Embassies, as well as by INS officers-in-charge. 277
Asylum Provisions
The Conference report adopted the House amendment on asy-
lum procedure, providing for the establishment of procedures for
a discretionary grant of asylum to an alien physically present in
the United States or at a land border or port of entry, regardless
of status.278 The mandatory nature of the Senate provision was
eliminated. Asylum could be terminated due to a change in the
political condition in the alien's country of nationality.
The provision for the adjustment of status for asylees adopted
by the conferees was essentially that which had appeared in both
the Senate and House versions.27 9 The Conference bill, however,
allowed for application for adjustment of status after one year of
physical presence in the United States rather than two.
273. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d) (5) (1980).
274. S. REP. No. 590, supra note 264, at 21.
275. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157(c), 1159 (1980).
276. S. REP. No. 590, supra note 264, at 21.
277. 126 CONG. REC. 1754 (1980).
278. 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1980).
279. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (1980).
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The conference bill adopted the House amendment of the with-
holding provision, mandating withholding except under four spe-
cific conditions.280 The conferees were careful, however, to note
their intent to conform with international law; the four specific
conditions are those set forth in the UN Convention.
The Conference substitute adopted the House provision with the under-
standing that it is based directly upon the language of the Protocol and it
is intended that the language be construed consistent with the
Protocol.28 1
Final House Passage
The major issue during the House debates on the Conference
bill was the failure to include the legislative veto provision. Con-
gressman Butler suggested the bill be sent back to "clean it up
and do it right ... .,,282 Congressman Rodino, disappointed that
the veto had been eliminated, nevertheless voiced his strong sup-
port for the bill, characterizing it as "one of the most important
pieces of humanitarian legislation ever enacted by a United
States Congress.... [It] confirm[ed] what this Government and
the American people are all about.... By their deep dedication
and untiring efforts, the United States once again ... demon-
strated its concern for the homeless, the defenseless, and the per-
secuted peoples who fall victim to tyrannical and oppressive
governmental regimes." 283 One of the last members to comment
on the bill, Congresswoman Chisholm expressed her hope that
the 50,000 number be distributed equitably and would "not be
tainted with ideological, geographical or racial or ethnic bi-
ases."2 84 She pointed out that of the "1.4 to 1.5 million refugees
that have entered this country since World War II... fewer than
2,000 have been from Latin America and Africa."285 The elimina-
tion of the legislative veto had, however, struck a nerve in the
Congress. The bill passed by a narrow 207 to 192 margin with 34
house members abstaining.
286
280. See note 240 supra; 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1980).
281. S. REP. No. 590, supra note 264, at 20.
282. 126 CONG. REc. 1519 (1980).
283. Id. at 1522.
284. Id. at 1523.
285. Id. at 1524.
286. Id. at 1528.
Final Senate Passage
In contrast, the Conference bill met very little resistance in the
Senate and, in fact, was adopted unanimously. The only Senator
to express misgivings was Senator Thurmond who felt that it en-
couraged welfare dependence and regretted the elimination of the
one-house veto provision. He still, however, voted for the bill.287
PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTATION
It is in light of this history, and legislative intent, that imple-
mentation of the Refugee Act and development of future refugee
admission and asylum policy must be viewed. What is most clear
from this history is that the Refugee Act is the product of years of
debate and compromise. The consensus that is reflected in the
Refugee Act represents careful consideration of deep, historic, hu-
manitarian and foreign policy interests of the United States. The
major emphasis of the legislation on a nondiscriminatory policy
and meaningful congressional participation in decisionmaking
cannot be ignored.
Since the Refugee Act passed, a number of significant events
have occurred which underscore some key areas of historic con-
cern. Only weeks after passage of the Refugee Act, the influx of
over 120,000 Cubans to Florida began, a process which brought
into question some of the most basic premises of the Refugee Act
and United States policy in general. In addition to these Cubans,
more than 20,000 Haitians had arrived in the Miami, Florida area.
This massive influx of people into the United States as a country
of first asylum raised serious questions about United States pol-
icy which are not easily solvable, either under the previous law or
the new Refugee Act.288 The Refugee Act was designed primarily
to control the admission of refugees through an orderly admis-
sions process, and these mass claims for asylum have severely
strained the existing legal framework. 28
9
In an effort to respond to this crisis and as a result of various
pressures from the Cuban and Haitian communities in the United
States, a broad range of religious, civil rights, social services
groups and others, the Carter Administration adopted a special
287. Id. at 1753-55.
288. At first the Cubans were admitted as refugees under the emergency provi-
sions of the Refugee Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1157(b) (1980); Presidential Determination No.
18-16, 45 Fed. Reg. 28,049 (1980). This was later changed, see note 290 infra.
289. This article does not specifically consider the issue of treating the U.S. as a
country of '"frst asylum"; the concerns which are raised by the arrival on our
shores of large number of asylum seekers. This subject deserves careful and sepa-
rate treatment. Yet many of the problems in implementation that are discussed
here are highly relevant to this general issue.
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Cuban-Haitian entry program as an interim measure.290
This temporary measure did not solve the larger set of
problems associated with the mass influx of people from particu-
lar countries seeking political asylum. Others will undoubtedly
want to focus specific attention on the mass asylum phenomenon
in the future. What is important to emphasize in the context of
the Refugee Act is that the problems raised by mass influx of asy-
lum seekers will not be solved by overly simplistic changes in the
law. While there have been and will continue to be emergency
measures proposed and perhaps adopted to address this issue,
the phenomenon cannot be prevented in the future. People with
a fear of persecution will continue to come to this country, in
search of freedom and a better life. This year they may be from
Haiti, El Salvador or Iran; in the next five years from Pakistan,
Guatemala, Poland or Iran.
Since the adoption of the Refugee Act and the Cuban-Haitian
crisis of 1980, two major governmental proposals have been made
on United States immigration policy. Both these proposals have
examined current refugee and asylum policy.
In March of 1981 the United States Select Commission on Immi-
gration and Refugee Policy (Select Commission) released its re-
port entitled U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest.291
In July 1981, the Reagan Administration's Interagency Task Force
on Immigration and Refugee Policy made public a series of their
proposals for immigration reform.292
Significantly, both groups have endorsed the general principles
and terms of the Refugee Act.293 At the same time, both reports
suggest a number of specific proposals which threaten to severely
undercut certain basic principles of the Refugee Act and notions
of fundamental fairness and due process which are basic to our
system.
Moreover, since the Refugee Act's enactment, both the INS and
the State Department have promulgated implementing regula-
290. U.S. Dep't of State, Cuban-Haitian Arrivals in the U.S., DEP'T OF STATE
BULL. 193 (1980).
291. SELECT COW'N ON IMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRATION
POLICY AN THE NATIONAL INTEREST, JOINT COMM. REP. No. 88 (1981) (hereinafter
cited as REPORT OF THE SELECT COM'N).
292. U.,S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON IMMIGRATION AND
REFUGEE PoLIcY 2-3 (1981) (hereinafter cited as REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE).
293. REPORT OF THE SELECT COMM'N, supra note 291, at 2-3.
tions and operation instructions. 294 In addition the first two con-
sultations with Congress regarding the annual admission of
refugees have occurred.295
In the following pages we will examine the manner in which the
Refugee Act has been implemented to date, examine several of
the proposals for modifications in the Refugee Act and make a
number of comments and recommendations regarding what we
perceive to be useful changes in current refugee and asylum
practices.
Terms of the Refugee Definition
The first element to consider in terms of implementation is the
definition of the term "refugee", as adopted by the Refugee Act.
In determining who should be given refugee status, it is important
to realize that the vast majority of migrants do not leave their
countries unless forced to do so by extreme circumstances. There
are many reasons that may compel a person to flee his country,
but a refugee is set apart from the other migrants because his mo-
tivation stems from a "well-founded fear of persecution on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion. '296 This key phrase of the defi-
nition embodies a complex assessment of the alien's subjective
perceptions and his objective background situation.297
The subjective element included an assessment of the appli-
cant's personality and beliefs. The political or religious convic-
tions of one person may make government policy intolerable.
Another person with no such convictions might find the same con-
ditions acceptable. As rated by the UNHCR:
The essential elements in the evaluation of the subjective feeling are the
questions of the degree of that fear and its credibility. In testing the sub-
jective element it may be necessary to examine the background of the ap-
plicant and his family and his position in the environment, his
membership of a particular racial, religious, national, social or political
group, his own interpretation of the situation and an account of his per-
294. INS Interim Regulations on Refugee and Asylum Procedures, 45 Fed. Reg.
37,392 (1981); U.S. Dep't of State Interim Guidelines for Processing of Refugee Ap-
plications (1980) (unpublished guidelines on ifie with Office of Refugee Coordina-
tor, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C.).
295. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMIS-
SIONS AND ALLOCATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1980 (1980), reprinted in U.S. Refugee
Programs supra note 3, at 66 (hereinafter cited as PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS
AND ALLoCATIONS-1980); U.S. COORDINATOR FOR REFUGEE AFFAIRS, REPORT TO CON-
GRESS ON PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FOR FIScAL YEAR 1981 (1980) (hereinaf-
ter cited as PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS AND ALLOCATioNS-1981).
296. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1980).
297. OFFICE OF THE UNIrED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON
PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS (1979) (hereinafter
cited as UN HANDBOOK).
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sonal experience and observation.
2 98
The applicant's frame of mind cannot be considered in isolation
but also must be viewed in the context of the objective conditions
that exist in his country of origin:
The fear must be well-founded either on personal experience or some
other concrete facts and the examiner is to decide whether the supporting
evidence is credible, plausible and sufficient to constitute 'veil-founded
fear" for a given person, making an objective appraisal of the circum-
stances which have been invoked.
299
Such circumstances need not have affected the applicant person-
ally. He may have a well-founded fear of persecution if relatives,
friends, or other members of the same racial or social group have
been persecuted.
The term "persecution" itself requires further analysis. Here
again, subjective elements and individual circumstances will, in
part, determine whether actions or threats amount to persecution.
Persecution may take the form of specific hostile acts or it may
consist of an accumulation of adverse circumstances such as dis-
crimination existing in an atmosphere of insecurity and fear. In
general, the definition of refugee implies that persecution must
emanate from the government itself and not from the local popu-
lace. But "where serious discriminatory or other offensive acts
are committed by the local populace, they can be considered as
persecution if they are knowingly tolerated by the authorities, or
if the authorities refuse, or prove unable, to offer effective
protection."300
Persecution must also be distinguished from punishment im-
posed for a violation of the laws of the applicant's native country.
In general, a fugitive from justice is not a refugee. But, where
punishment is excessive for the reasons mentioned in the defini-
tion or where the law itself or its application is discriminatory,
such a person may be considered a refugee. Finally, an applicant
with strong dissenting political beliefs who is falsely accused of a
"nonpolitical"' crime on trumped-up charges will also fall within
the definition.
Persecution may also take the form of economic deprivation if
that deprivation can be considered to have a political basis. Al-
298. LEGAL DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMe'R FOR REFU-
GEE STATUS, EuGmrr-A GuIDE FOR THE STAFF OF THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
NATONS COm1'R FOR REFUGEES 69 (1962) (hereinafter cited as ELIGIBIY GUIDE).
299. Id.
300. UN HANDBooic, supra note 297, at 18-19.
though a pure economic migrant (i.e. one who is motivated by ex-
clusively economic considerations) does not qualify under the
definition, the distinction between economic and political motiva-
tion is often blurred or artificial.30o
Both the motivation of the applicant and the conditions in his
country of origin may involve interrelated economic and political
factors. The relative importance of economic and political consid-
erations to the individual applicant should be examined along the
continuum of possible motivating forces. The applicant must be
considered a refugee only if his primary motivation is political.
The effect of the interrelation of economic deprivation and polit-
ical oppression on the applicant may be divided into three analyt-
ical categories. First, the government may use economic
measures to effect persecution "on account of race, religion, na-
tionality, membership in a particular social group or political
opinion ....." Thus, the Soviet dissident who is denied permis-
sion to work can clearly be considered a refugee.
Second, active objection to the economic situation may in itself
be a political act. The country's economic and political problems
may be symptoms of the same oppression or violation of human
rights. The economic structure may entail political repression or
the political system may require oppressive economic measures
to insure its survival. Thus, it should be recognized that the trade
unionist or farmer who objects to the extortion of government se-
curity forces is acting in the political as well as the economic
realm.
Finally, the applicant may be directly affected by the political-
economic system as described above but may not react politically
or see his problem in a political framework. The initial processing
of the Haitian applicants is an example of the need for sensitivity
in the examination of such a group of applicants. In Haitian Refu-
gee Center v. Civiletti,30 2 Judge King stated that "[m]uch of Ha-
iti's poverty is a result of Duvalier's efforts to maintain power.
Indeed it could be said that Duvalier had made his country weak
so that he could be strong."3 03 The mass exodus of Haitian intel-
lectuals and professionals that resulted in an inadequate system
of education, medical care, and public administration was the out-
come of a deliberate government policy of instilling fear among
301. The concerns and mistrust of disallowing refugee status to so-called "eco-
nomic immigrants" was central to congressional debate on the Refugee Act. As a
result of these concerns a congressional proposal to explicitly exclude "economic
immigrants" from the "refugee" definition was rejected. See notes 138-40 supra
and accompanying text.
302. Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 403 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
303. Id.
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the elite. The government's fiscal system, in which fifty percent of
public revenues were not subject to any form of accounting, re-
sulted in disorganization, inefficiency and corruption. The lack of
security due to legal and political uncertainties provided disincen-
tives to workers and reduced the import of private capital. Judge
King concluded: "[t] o broadly classify all of the class of plaintiffs
as economic refugees; [sic] as has been repeatedly done, is there-
fore somewhat callous. Their economic situation is a political
condition."3
04
Clearly not all poor Haitians, or other applicants who would fall
within this third category, are refugees, but many who do not ex-
press themselves in political terms have, in fact, fled for political
reasons. Such an understanding of the applicant's position de-
pends on a sensitive fact-finding process that can deduce the im-
plicit political content of the alien's story and can incorporate
complex information on the objective conditions existing in the
country of origin.
Compliance with the letter and spirit of the new definition re-
quires a careful understanding of the motivations, beliefs, situa-
tion and experience of the applicant. Assessment of these factors
is particularly difficult since asylum applicants frequently do not
speak English and are almost always unfamiliar with American
legal procedures and customs. Many are deeply fearful and suspi-
cious of government officials and resist the open discussion of
their circumstances that is so important to a just resolution of
their applications.
The Allocation Process
Considering this legislative history, the initial implementation
of the Refugee Act already suggests several areas where federal
authorities have failed to incorporate adequately this "universal
refugee standard" in immigration practice. One major element of
this problem is the annual refugee allocations process and its
implementation.
The Carter Administration's first Annual Report to Congress on
April 15, 1980 revealed that of 114,284 refugees admitted into the
United States during the first six months of fiscal year 1980, only
120 were from Africa, and only sixty-four from all of Latin
304. Id.
America outside of Cuba. The Administration projected that dur-
ing the second half of fiscal 1980, despite the enactment of the
Refugee Act, only 946 refugees would be admitted from Latin
America outside of Cuba and only 1,380 from Africa.305 When
viewed in comparison to a projected total annual admission of
230,700, the allocation of 2,500 from all of Africa and Latin America
(outside of Cuba) neither constitutes fair, equitable treatment
nor primary reliance on humanitarian concerns as mandated by
the Refugee Act.
The Administration's April 15, 1980 Report to Congress indi-
cated its intention to continue this geographically discriminatory
refugee policy in the future. While devoting considerable atten-
tion to the situation in Indochina, from where an estimated
168,000 refugees will be admitted, and Eastern Europe, from
where 38,000 refugees will come, there was virtually no discussion
of the current situations in Latin America or Africa.
The second consultation in September 1980 reflected a continu-
ation of the discriminatory allocation process. Of 217,000 pro-
posed admissions for fiscal year 1981 only 4,000 were from Latin
America (including 2,500 Cubans, half of whom will come from
Spain) and 3,000 from Africa. By contrast, the Office of the United
States Coordinator for Refugee Affairs proposed the admission of
168,000 people from Indochina and 33,000 from the Soviet Union.306
Considering the political instability and on-going violations of
basic human rights occurring in countries throughout the Carib-
bean, Central and South America, 1,500 annual refugee admis-
sions from this entire region fails completely to respond to this
crisis. When viewed in comparison to the projected total admis-
sion of 217,000 people, the figures for Latin America, Africa and
Asia (outside of Indochina) neither constitute equitable treat-
ment nor primary reliance on "humanitarian concerns" as man-
dated by the Refugee Act.
The long-term character of the refugee problem in the Western
Hemisphere 'cannot be ignored or under-emphasized. The influx
in the last year of tens of thousands of Cubans, Haitians,
Salvadorians and others from the Caribbean, Central and South
America, cannot be dismissed as an isolated or unique occur-
rence. As long as political, social and economic conditions create
instability in these countries, people will leave and seek a better
life. Not all can or should be considered refugees under the strict
305. PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS AND ALLocATIONs-1980, supra note 295, at
66.
306. PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMnssxos AND ALLOCATIONS-1981, supra note 295, at
160.
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provisions of our law. But as recent patterns have clearly demon-
strated, a refusal to recognize the dimensions of the problem in
our own hemisphere will not stop people from coming here. Any
solution to the problem of uncontrolled entry (mass first asylum)
must include some provision for the admission of a certain
number of people from refugee-producing countries. While every
effort must be made to admit a certain number of people from ref-
ugee-producing countries, it is also essential that the procedures
adopted assure refuge to those facing the greatest threat of severe
persecution such as physical torture or death. While increased
refugee admissions will not necessarily stop others from coming
here illegally, failure to take such action seriously undermines a
strict enforcement policy.
It is not realistic to suggest, as the Select Commission has done,
that Latin American allocations can be low, in part, because of a
regional tendency "to focus upon local resettlement."30 7 The mas-
sive influx of Haitians, Cubans, Salvadorians, Nicaraguans,
Guatemalans and others clearly refutes this notion, particularly
with regard to people who are fleeing countries in our own region,
particularly in Central America and the Caribbean.
A more constructive suggestion proposed by the Select Com-
mission is that "[s]pecific numbers be provided for political pris-
oners, victims of torture and persons under threat of death
regardless of their geographic origin."3 08 This standard seems
sensible, especially when applied to victims of particularly severe
physical abuse, as a preferred category for assistance. Yet, it
should be applied in the first instance on a worldwide basis when
determining refugee admissions, and not as a residual category to
allow a few thousand admissions after the bulk of the allocation
numbers have been determined on other groups.
A revised allocation formula does not require any change in the
law, but simply a carefully considered policy to modify current
admissions policy. In this regard it should be emphasized that an
equitable admissions program does not mean that a greater
number of refugees must or should be admitted to the United
States in future years. Rather, it requires only that the alloca-
tions be equitably determined so that refugees in search of a new
307. REPORT OF THE SELECT COWII'N, supra note 291, at 160.
308. Id.
home are treated humanely and fairly regardless of their national
origin.
Organizational Structures for Admissions
Allocation problems have been exacerbated by federal regula-
tions promulgated in June 1980. Section 207.4 of these regulations
requires an INS officer-in-charge to approve every application for
refugee status (Form 1-590).309 However, because there are no
INS overseas offices outside of Europe and Hong Kong, this re-
quirement severely restricts refugee determinations.
In an effort to develop some interim solution to this problem, on
July 18, 1980 the State Department promulgated interim guide-
lines for the processing of refugees' applications by consular offi-
cials.310 These guidelines allow consular officers in Africa and
Latin America to conduct initial screening of individual refugee
applicants and cable information to an INS officer-in-charge who
will make the final determination. This procedure seems cumber-
some and unnecessary. There is no reason why consular officers
cannot make these determinations themselves, working in consul-
tation with the voluntary agencies that are assisting in
resettlement.
Recently promulgated INS operating instructions on asylum
procedures and State Department interim guidelines to consular
officers also suggest that the concept of a nonideologically or geo-
graphically based refugee policy has not been completely under-
stood or accepted. On June 16, 1980 the INS Central Office issued
operating instructions on asylum and refugee adjustments. 11
Section 208.8 of those instructions creates a preferred category of
asylum cases which are termed "immediate-action cases." Under
this provision an application for asylum is reviewed immediately,
the applicant interviewed expeditiously and the asylum request is
decided promptly, subject only to communications with INS cen-
tral and regional officials and with the State Department. These
communications can be carried out by phone and presumably
asylum can be granted within a matter of hours. Yet, the benefits
of this special provision are limited to several classes of appli-
cants including foreign diplomats, those facing a "serious threat
of forcible repatriation", "any national of the Soviet Union" or
any national of fourteen nations (all communist-bloc countries,
though not Yugoslavia, Afghanistan or Ethiopia) who is part of an
official visit for formal cultural or athletic exchange. (section
309. INS Interim Regulations, supra note 294.
310. U.S. Dep't of State Interim Guidelines, supra note 294.
311. INS O.L § 208 (1980), supra note 294.
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208.8(a)). The effect of these latter provisions is to reintroduce
the discriminatory treatment of refugees from noncommunist
countries, despite the clear legislative intent to the contrary.
312
Similarly, paragraph ten of the State Department interim guide-
lines is also unfairly discriminatory. It describes those refugees
who are deemed to be of special interest to the United States.
The list includes close relatives of persons in the United States,
persons of "special humanitarian concern," former employees of
American organizations or American individuals, and persons
trained in the United States or trained abroad under United
States auspices.313 These criteria, which seem arbitrary at best,
will have a tremendous impact on decisions concerning admis-
sions. Such a determination of United States priorities should be
subject to input from Congress, from nongovernmental and volun-
tary agencies, from the UNHCR and from the public.
In examining the implementation of the Refugee Act, Congress
should review these and other provisions and urge amendments
to any regulations or operating instructions that undermine the
basic legislative intent of the Act. Congress should also strongly
encourage the development of uniform, practical adminstrative
procedures.
Role of INS District Offices
The first phase of the asylum application process is perhaps the
most critical. It is vital at this stage that the applicants be given
an initial opportunity to explain the relevant facts of his claim in
a nonadversarial setting. A judicial hearing-an event which most
Americans find threatening--cannot provide this opportunity. We
therefore propose that the local INS offices process asylum appli-
cations in the first instance along the lines proposed by the
UNHCR in comments dated March, 1980:
(1) The applicant for asylum should submit at the local INS office his ap-
plication in the form of a written statement of the relevant facts and mo-
tives in his own way. In addition, the applicant should complete a
questionnaire concerning his personal data, his passport, relevant visa in-
formation, etc.
(2) The local INS office then should invite the applicant to participate in
an interview which shall be recorded in the form of a Sworn Statement. It
shall be conducted by the responsible INS official for asylum matters in
that district. This interview should be conducted on the basis of guide-
312. Id.
313. U.S. Dep't of State Interim Guidelines, supra note 294.
lines issued by the INS central office in cooperation with the State Depart-
ment. The guidelines should be designed to enable the local INS official to
take into account special circumstances with respect to the nationality of
the applicant.
314
The district office procedures should be designed to help appli-
cants to understand the requirements for establishing a political
asylum claim and to provide the evidence necessary to substanti-
ate such a claim. As noted by the UNHCR:
A refugee often tells his story in nonpolitical terms. Some refugees are
politically inarticulate in the sense of not being able to express their polit-
ical views though they may have very definite opinions for which they
have had to suffer. Others do not wish to discuss politics because they
have had too much of it and prefer not to be personally involved. There
are also some who are afraid to say what they think. In such latter cases
their silence may well be the result of fear of persecution and it may be
necessary to reveal the applicant's psychological attitudes by indirect
questioning without the use of political terms or such technical expres-
sions as "fear" and "persecution.
'315
In such cases refugees particularly need the advice and support
of an attorney. Legal counsel gives substantial assistance in
presenting evidence and conducting cross-examination at the
hearing. Finally and perhaps most importantly, the expertise of a
lawyer is often vital in the preparation of the application for asy-
lum (Form 1-589) which includes the organization of affidavits and
documentary evidence so that the client is represented as fairly
as possible. Therefore, the limiting of legal counsel that is inher-
ent in the Administration's proposed policy (contained in Report
of the Task Force) jeopardizes the applicant's right to due process
and fundamental fairness.
To ensure that applicants receive the sympathetic assistance
necessary to a fair resolution of their claims, asylum cases should
be separated out from routine immigration cases and handled by
specially trained officials. The practice of considering asylum
cases under routine immigration procedures ignores the unique
and often complex nature of these cases. Consequently, the
rights of aliens to effectively present their claims for asylum are
often thwarted. In the larger district offices, this may require the
appointment of an Asylum Admissions Officer, an idea presented
in the Select Commission Report of March 1981316 and by the In-
teragency Task Force in July 1981.317 The need for coordination at
a supervisory level is particularly apparent in a large district of-
fice such as New York, where an unwieldy administrative struc-
ture often creates additional problems. As a matter of course,
314. Office of the United Nation High Comm'n for Refugees, U.S. Asylum Proce-
dures (1980) (unpublished comments).
315. Eligibility Guide, supra note 298, at 67.
316. REPORT OF THE SELECT CoMr'N, supra note 291, at 173-74.
317. REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE, supra note 292, at 1.
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these cases are transferred repeatedly within a district office, re-
sulting in lengthy delays, general confusion, and, all too often,
loss or misplacement of files.
The Asylum Admissions Officers would supervise all aspects of
asylum cases within each office and would also maintain ongoing
communications with the State Department. Before beginning
their assignments, every supervisor would undergo extensive
training as to existing laws and regulations relating to asylum,
current State Department and UNHCR practices. Each asylum
supervisor would also be required to be familiar with recent di-
rectives affecting various groups of aliens and would work with
the officers assigned to conduct asylum interviews. Finally, the
Asylum Admissions Officer would conduct an in-house training
program designed to help officials deal with the particular
problems involved in gathering information from refugees, many
of whom have suffered persecution and physical mistreatment. In
the Administration's recently disclosed policy proposal, the Asy-
lum Admission Officer would make final administrative decisions
thus limiting the advisory and appellate roles presently included
in the process. Such a decisionmaking responsibility is not in-
cluded in the Select Commission's concept of an Asylum Admis-
sion Officer and serves to hinder the fairness of the application.
Interim federal regulations on asylum, dated June 2, 1980 raise a
number of serious issues regarding INS implementation of the
Refugee Act.318 Many of these issues were raised in comments
submitted to the INS by various public-interest and human rights
organizations in July 1980. A summary of the most critical points
follows:
1. We believe that every asylum applicant should have the op-
portunity for an initial interview with a district director, and that
this opportunity should not depend on whether the applicant
manages to apply for asylum before the government begins exclu-
sion or deportation proceedings. Accordingly, the district director
should have jurisdiction in all cases. The result could be achieved
by a provision requiring the immigration judge to remand to the
district director any case in which an application for asylum has
been filed.
2. Section 208.7 provides that the district director must seek an
advisory opinion from the State Department's Bureau of Human
318. INS Interim Regulations, supra note 294.
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (BHRHA) in all cases. We sug-
gest that the State Department only be consulted and asked to
advise INS in those cases where the district office has doubts on
factual questions. (See the section on Refugee Review Board on
pages 79-81). It is unrealistic to think that BHRHA will have suffi-
cient staff to consider carefully every application for asylum in
the country.
3. Furthermore, mandatory reference may encourage district
directors to shift the responsibility for decisionmaking; if an over-
worked State Department fails to respond or responds negatively
after a cursory review, district directors may feel relieved from
the burden of the careful review necessary to reach a fair deter-
mination. Finally, the procedure is costly; it often creates an addi-
tional layer of review where none is necessary.
4. The regulations provide no appeal from the denial of an asy-
lum application by a district director (section 208.8(c)). No excep-
tion is made for cases in which the BHRHA recommends asylum
but the district director denies it. A change granting a right of ap-
peal to the INS regional commissioner in all cases would give asy-
lum applicants a right already accorded in much less sensitive
and critical proceedings, such as applications for changes in non-
immigrant status (e.g. from visitor status to student status under
8 C.F.R. section 103.1(m) (12) (a) (1980)). At the very least, in
cases where the BHRHA recommends asylum and the district di-
rector denies it, the application should be certified to the INS re-
gional commissioner for final decision (the procedure under prior
regulations).
5. Section 208.8(f) of the regulations provides that the grant of
asylum shall be for one year and that the asylee shall be inter-
viewed annually to determine continued eligibility. This provi-
sion makes the asylee's position unnecessarily precarious and is
totally inconsistent with the UN Convention and Protocol Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees, to which the United States is a
party. The UN Convention makes asylum a legal status which can
only be withdrawn upon the occurrence of certain specified
events.
6. To grant asylum only in one-year increments subject to a
yearly eligibility review will make finding employment and other-
wise leading a normal existence impossible for many applicants.
The yearly review will also place a large and unnecessary burden
on the INS in terms of both time and money.319
319. Unpublished comments to the June 2, 1980 Interim Regulations were sub-
mitted by a number of organizations including the Lawyers Committee for Inter-
national Human Rights, the Alien Rights Law Project of the Washington Lawyers
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Again federal asylum regulations should also provide that appli-
cants have a right to assistance from counsel or another represen-
tative of their choosing in preparing their questionnaires and
applications and in making sworn statements to INS officials. As
mentioned above, assistance from a lawyer or other trusted per-
son may be the only means by which many applicants will be able
to fully state their cases. For this assistance to be meaningful,
counsel must, of course, be permitted to participate in the inter-
view, (i.e. to clarify questions or to object to improperly tran-
scribed answers). To fairly implement the right to counsel,
applicants should be notified of this right and advised of the exist-
ence of free legal service programs in the district. It is also impor-
tant that the regulations provide adequate time during the asylum
proceeding for the preparation of the claim. Efficiency is not
served by oppressive deadlines which may lead to unjust
decisions.
Role of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
The problems being discussed are global in nature and demand
an internationally coordinated response. Thus, the United States
should seek at every opportunity to increase international partici-
pation in this process and encourage various resettlement efforts
in different countries. This process can best be accomplished by
relying more closely on the office of the UNHCR which, since its
formation following World War II, has developed into a highly
respected and professional international agency-a world expert
in refugee matters.
Although the expertise and impartiality of the UNHCR make it
uniquely qualified to evaluate claims for asylum and to insure
that the United States is complying with international standards,
its participation has been largely ignored under existing United
States law and practice. The UNHCR has reviewed some individ-
ual cases that have been referred to it by the State Department
and occasionally has undertaken a more systematic review (e.g.
with Haitian and Cuban refugees) but its role has not been for-
mally incorporated into the United States asylum process. By
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, the National Lawyers Guild, the Interna-
tional Human Rights Law Group and the American Council of Voluntary Agen-
cies. (Comments on fie with the Lawyers Committee for International Human
Rights, N.Y., N.Y.).
adopting the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, the
United States made a commitment to abide by international law
in its treatment of refugees. Congress gave meaning to this com-
mitment by adopting the Refugee Act of 1980 which, as stated
above, conforms the definition of "refugee" to that contained in
the Protocol. It is now incumbent on the executive branch to
make good our intention to comply with international standards
by conforming the administration of our refugee law with the ad-
vice of UNHCR.
In a number of countries, including Canada and Australia, the
Office of the High Commissioner participates directly in proce-
dures established for the determination of refugee status. Such
participation is based on Article 35 of the UN Convention and the
corresponding Article II of the 1967 Protocol which provide for the
cooperation by the contracting states with the High Commis-
sioner's office. 320 Both the Canadian and the Australian models
also illustrate the possibility of giving nongovernmental organiza-
tions a role in the advisory process. 321
In light of the procedures adopted by these and other countries
and considering the authority and qualification of the UNHCR, we
make the following recommendations to provide a formal mecha-
nism for the incorporation of UNHCR into United States refugee
and asylum policy:
1. The legal advisor of the State Department or the General
Counsel of the INS should consult on a regular basis with repre-
sentatives from the UNHCR concerning international instruments
and their implementation. Such a consultation would allow for
clarification of definitional questions and insure that administra-
tive procedures and subsequent guidelines conform to United
States international obligations.
2. To insure that the procedures and guidelines are carefully
and sensitively applied, the UNHCR should have a formal role in
training INS and State Department personnel.
3. The UNHCR should have jurisdiction to give advisory opin-
ions in individual refugee cases. These cases would be submitted
by the individual applicant who should be informed that he has a
right to contact the UNHCR. Approval for review would be at the
discretion of the UNHCR. In selecting cases and in presenting an
advisory opinion, the UNHCR should have access to the appli-
cant's entire file. The advisory opinion ultimately reached should
320. UN Convention, supra note 7.
321. B. Jackman & B. Knaza, Refugees (1980) (unpublished paper presenting a
detailed description of the Canadian system. On file with the Lawyers Committee
for International Human Rights, N.Y., N.Y.).
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then be submitted to the State Department and become part of
the record of the case. The role of the UNHCR could best be in-
corporated into the United States process in the context of a refu-
gee review board.
Board for the Determination of Refugee Status
We recommend the establishment of a "Board for the Determi-
nation of Refugee Status and Asylum" (Board). Such a board,
which is also suggested by the Select Commission,322 would serve
multiple functions such as:
1. Helping to develop and clarify refugee and asylum stan-
dards and procedures;
2. Overseeing and reviewing all aspects of implementation of
the Refugee Act;
3. Participating in the executive review and determination of
annual refugee allocations;
4. Reviewing applications for political asylum deemed frivo-
lous by the district officer; and
5. Consulting with Congress and the Executive when emer-
gency situations arise.
The proposed Board would be composed of seven members:
three representatives of the executive branch, including an official
of the State Department (representing the BHRHA, Office of the
Refugee Coordinator, Office of the Legal Advisor and Bureau of
Consular Affairs); an official from the Department of Justice (rep-
resenting the INS); and perhaps a representative of the Executive
Office of the White House. The Board would also include three
public members that could represent the various voluntary and
church-related agencies that participate in the resettlement pro-
cess, other charitable, civic, labor and business representatives
and perhaps a representative from a nongovernmental human
rights organization. These three positions could rotate annually
or biannually in order to provide each group with a chance to par-
ticipate in this process. The seventh member of the Board would
be from the office of the UNHCR. The UNHCR would participate
in an advisory capacity and would serve in much the same role as
it does in Canada, Australia and other countries.
The Board would meet regularly to examine overall United
322. REPORT OF THE SELECT CoMM'N, supra note 291, at 169-71.
States refugee and asylum policy, concentrating on the following
areas:
1. Development and clarification of refugee and asylum stan-
dards and procedures.
As discussed earlier, in the initial period following the passage of
the Refugee Act a number of problems and questions have arisen
concerning the standards for determining refugee status, and in
developing procedures to make and carry out these determina-
tions. A number of the areas mentioned in this report will require
careful and ongoing discussion and study. While the Commission
should be able to make a significant initial contribution to that
process, ongoing review is critical. The mandate of the Board can
and should include these functions. In this context the Board
would consider, for example, the criteria for selecting refugees
and help to interpret concepts such as "special humanitarian con-
cern" and "national interest."
2. Overview of the implementation of the Refugee Act.
For similar reasons, it is essential that ongoing review of the im-
plementation of the Refugee Act be incorporated into the work of
the Board. Issues such as the processing of refugees by consular
officers overseas could be monitored by the Board at regular in-
tervals. INS processing of asylum applications would be reviewed
periodically. The Board would also make recommendations con-
cerning the training of INS personnel and consular officials, and
examine organizational structures of these agencies. It would re-
port annually to Congress and the Executive, with specific recom-
mendations for reform.
3. Participation in the review and determination of annual ref-
ugee allocations.
The Board would have an important advisory and consultative
role in the annual refugee allocation process. In this regard we
propose that three months prior to the official consultation pro-
cess provided for by section 207 of the Refugee Act, the Board
would hold public hearing examining the worldwide refugee situ-
ation in order to formulate an appropriate allocation formula.
These hearings would formalize input of the United Nations, vari-
ous voluntary agencies, human rights organizations, and other
concerned groups and individuals, thus helping to broaden and
depoliticize the decisionmaking process. These hearings would
constitute a world survey of refugees similar to the annual State
Department evaluation of human rights. Following the hearings,
the Board would be in a position to report on its findings to mem-
bers of Congress, and to participate, formally and informally, in
the consultation process.
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4. Review of frivolous cases.
We propose that three members of the Board, one from the exec-
utive branch, one from the public-interest groups, and the
UNHCR representative, be involved in reviewing those cases that
the district office had deemed frivolous. In such cases the Board
would serve an appellate function. If the Board agreed with INS
that the cases were frivolous, the applicant would be subject to
immediate deportation proceedings. If, as may occasionally hap-
pen, the Board disagreed with INS and concluded that a case had
merit or needed further information, it would be referred to the
State Department for an advisory opinion.
5. Consultation with Congress and the Executive when emer-
gency situations arise.
The Board could also be utilized to examine various policy con-
siderations in emergency situations. Thus, for example, the re-
cent crisis involving Cubans and Haitians in Florida could have
been evaluated by the Board, which could then have issued a re-
port making observations and recommendations to assist the
Congress and the Executive in this crisis.
This outline of potential roles for the Board is by no means de-
finitive. The concept of a refugee board should be flexible in na-
ture and its mandate broad enough to allow it to respond to
changing circumstances. Most importantly, the Board provides an
opportunity to develop an open and ongoing evaluation of United
States refugee policy, a task that can be accomplished most effec-
tively with the cooperation and active participation of the UNHCR
and various nongovernmental organizations whose daily work
makes them uniquely qualified to contribute to this process.
The Role of the State Department
The input of the State Department is important in the evalua-
tion of the objective basis of the applicant's fear of persecution
based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a social group
or political opinion. An applicaht's background cannot be as-
sessed without a current understanding of the political and social
situation in his native country. Although the State Department's
view of particular countries may be colored by foreign policy con-
siderations, it is still the only government agency charged with
the responsibility of gathering and analyzing this necessary infor-
mation. We therefore believe that the State Department's view
should be sought except in cases where their district director has
sufficient information to grant asylum.
The Department must have a formal role in the decisionmaking
process, not just an option to comment. Such a role can be insti-
tuted by mandatory State Department review of unclear cases
and through the Department's participation in the "Board for the
Determination of Refugee Status and Asylum" mentioned in the
preceding section. Procedures have been set forth in the interim
regulations to give the State Department a formal role. The regu-
lations provide that the district director must seek an advisory
opinion from the BHRHA in all cases. We believe that clearly
meritorious cases need not be referred to the BHRHA. Given the
problems of staff size and budgetary constraints, the BHRHA can-
not consider every application for asylum in the country.
Mandatory reference of clearly meritorious cases will detract
from the State Department's consideration of truly difficult cases,
encourage district directors to shift responsibility for decision-
making, and unnecessarily burden the administrative process.
In light of these problems, we make the following recommenda-
tions for efficient use of State Department resources:
1. The district directors should be instructed to grant asylum
in clearly meritorious cases without reference to the BHRHA and
to pass on cases deemed frivolous to the Board also without con-
sulting the BHRHA.
2. The district offices should be required to report their deter-
mination in asylum cases to both the BHRHA and the Board.
This would allow the State Department to monitor treatment of
asylum applicants throughout the country without participating
directly in each decision.
3. In order to prevent undue delay in the resolution of asylum
applications, the regulations should provide that if the State De-
partment fails to respond or set forth reasons requiring an exten-
sion within the present forty-five day limit, and if the applicant so
requests, the district director shall decide the case without the
advisory opinion.
4. The role and training of consular officers should be reexam-
ined. The procedures outlined in the State Department's July 18,
1980 Interim Guidelines 323 for the processing of refugee applica-
tions by consular officers are cumbersome and time consuming.
We recommend that consular officers be given independent juris-
diction to make refugee determinations without references to the
INS officer-in-charge. This responsibility represents a new under-
323. See note 294 supra.
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taking for consular officers who traditionally have been concerned
with the processing of visa applications. For this reason, it is im-
portant that the consular officials be trained and supervised. We
propose that the Foreign Service Institute, with the assistance of
the UNHCR and nongovernmental organizations, provide the nec-
essary education for prospective officers and training sessions for
present officers.
5. Nongovernmental and voluntary organizations should also
play a role in providing the officers with information necessary to
determine difficult refugee cases. While the State Department
section 502(b) Human Rights Country Reports324 often provide
valuable information, they are prepared by a political entity that
is also concerned with other foreign policy considerations. Thus,
it is crucial that they not be the sole source of information in de-
termining current conditions in a particular area of the world. Re-
ports by Amnesty International and other such groups may be
equally if not more informative and should be used by all over-
seas consular posts. Coordination of the consular officer's work
concerning refugees could be provided by a supervisory official on
each continent who would be responsible for an up-to-date and
detailed knowledge of regulations and operating instructions, an
understanding of the social and political climate in each country,
and informing the consular officers of new guidelines and
procedures.
6. A procedure for appeal of decisions in questionable cases
should be established. Neither section 208 of the June INS In-
terim Regulations nor the subsequently promulgated interim
guidelines for consular officers3 25 provide a right to appeal to ap-
plicants for refugee status. This omission deserves serious con-
sideration by the Select Commission. Refugee cases can, and
often do, involve the physical safety of applicants and their fami-
lies. Yet the current regulations, which grant unfettered discre-
tion to State Department consular officials and INS overseas
officers-in-charge, fail to allow any review of these decisions. This
policy increases the probability of uncorrected errors and abuses
of discretion. These problems are especially serious in the initial
324. Published pursuant to §§ 116(d) and 502(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 as amended, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2396 (1961). See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
CoUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1981).
325. INS Interim Regulations and U.S. Dep't of State Interim Guidelines, supra
note 294.
period, since consular officials are undertaking these responsibili-
ties for the first time, presumably without any formal training, or
detailed written instructions as to how to gather information in
these cases.
A second complicating factor is the cumbersome and time-con-
suming procedure that involves the participation of both consular
officials and INS overseas officers. Presumably the final decision
in these cases will be made by INS officers who will be relying on
a cable summary of each case. Often applicants will be thousands
of miles away in areas where existing conditions are likely to be
unfamiliar to INS officers. According to several administration
proposals which are yet to be aired, the new policy will greatly di-
minish the appeals process by limiting the right to appeal to those
applicants who are in status.
We recommend, in view of the difficulties enumerated above,
that Congress should enact an appropriate appeals procedure
which would allow review of decisions in all questionable cases.
The Consultation Process
Clear legislative intent to "assure that Congress has a proper
and substantial role in all decisions on refugee admissions" is ap-
parent from the emphasis on the consultation process in section
207 of the Refugee Act and the explicit definition of the procedure
provided by section 207(e).326
The Refugee Act deliberately institutionalizes what was previ-
ously an informal, ad hoc process of consultation. Section 207 re-
quires consultation between the President and Congress
concerning the allocation of refugee numbers. It specifies that
discussions shall occur between "[c]abinet-level representatives
of the President" and members of the Judiciary Committees of
the House and Senate. The stated purpose of the consultation is:
326. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(e) (1980). Congress is to be provided, "to the extent possi-
ble", with the information listed below:
(1) A description of the nature of the refugee situation.
(2) A description of the number and allocation of the refugees to be ad-
mitted and an analysis of conditions within the countries from which
they came.
(3) A description of the proposed plans for their movement and resettle-
ment and the estimated cost of their movement and resettlement.
(4) An analysis of the anticipated social, economic and demographic im-
pact of their admission to the United States.
(5) A description of the extent to which other countries will admit and
assist in the resettlement of such refugees.
(6) An analysis of the impact of the participation of the United States in
the resettlement of such refugees on the foreign policy interests of
the United States.
(7) Such additional information as may be appropriate or requested by
such members.
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[t]o review the refugee situation or emergency refugee situation, to pro-
ject the extent of possible participation of the United States therein, to
discuss reasons for believing that the proposed admission of refugees is
justified by humanitarian concerns or grave humanitarian concerns or is
otherwise in the national interest .... 
327
The consultation process allows for more informed decision mak-
ing concerning the allocation of refugee numbers and helps in the
implementation of a coherent refugee policy.
If this goal is to be accomplished and if the consultation is to be
meaningful, Congress should be informed in detail of the Admin-
istration's refugee plan well in advance of the official consultation.
We believe that "at least two weeks in advance of discussions
. .. ," as provided by Section 207(e), is an insufficient period of
time. As pointed out by several members of the Select Commis-
sion, Congress must have time to evaluate the proposal, allow
public scrutiny of the numbers and obtain the views of nongov-
ernmental organizations, human rights groups and the UNHCR.
For these reasons, we recommend that the allocation numbers be
submitted thirty days before the formal consultation process oc-
curs. Prior to congressional evaluation, the proposed "Board for
the Determination of Refugee Status and Asylum" would hold
hearings in an effort to institutionalize input from the UNHCR,
voluntary agencies and nongovernmental organizations (such as
Amnesty International). These hearings could provide a forum to
review the world refugee situation and to gather information on
human rights conditions that may help predict future refugee
problems. Once the proposed allocation numbers are submitted
to Congress, Congress could then hold informal hearings subse-
quent to those of the Board but prior to the formal consultation.
Here, the allocation figures could be evaluated in light of the find-
ings of the Board and the testimony of the participants. Only
within this expanded time framework can Congress responsibly
perform its role in refugee admissions decisions.
Summary of Recommendations
To highlight, some of the more general recommendations are
briefly summarized below:
1. Amend regulations and instructions:
In light of the legislative intent of the Act, administrative regula-
tions and operating instructions concerning refugee and asylum
327. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(e) (1980).
processing should be amended to eliminate any ideological or ge-
ographical bias. Determination of United States priorities con-
cerning criteria for decisionmaking should be subject to public
review, input from Congress as well as nongovernmental and vol-
untary agencies and the UNHCR.
2. Role of the INS District Offices:
The district director should have jurisdiction in all asylum cases.
Thus, the immigration judge should be required to remand to the
district director any case in which an application for asylum has
been filed. Asylum cases should be separated from routine immi-
gration cases and handled by specially trained officials. In larger
district offices an asylum officer should be appointed and trained.
The officer would maintain ongoing communications with the
State Department, work with officers assigned to conduct asylum
interviews and conduct an in-house training program. Regula-
tions should provide applicants with the right to assistance from
counsel when preparing their applications and during their inter-
views. Applicants should be notified of this right and advised of
the existence of free legal service programs in the district.
3. Role of the UNHCR:
The legal advisor of the State Department or the General Counsel
of the INS should consult on a regular basis with representatives
from the UNHCR concerning international instruments and their
implementation. To insure that the procedures and guidelines
are carefully and sensitively applied, the UNHCR should have a
formal role in training INS and State Department personnel. The
UNHCR should have jurisdiction to give advisory opinions in indi-
vidual refugee cases. These cases would be submitted by the in-
dividual applicant who should be informed that he has a right to
contact the UNHCR and approved for review at the discretion of
the UNHCR. In selecting cases and in presenting an advisory
opinion, the UNHCR should have access to the applicant's entire
file. The advisory opinion ultimately reached should then be sub-
mitted to the State Department and become part of the record of
the case.
4. Development of a refugee board:
A "Board for the Determination of Refugee Status and Asylum"
composed of three representatives of the executive branch, three
public members representing voluntary and church-related agen-
cies, and one representative from the UNHCR should be estab-
lished. This Board would:
a. help to develop and clarify refugee and asylum standards
and procedures;
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b. oversee and review all aspects of implementation of the
Refugee Act;
c. participate in the executive review and determination of an-
nual refugee allocations;
d. review those applications for asylum deemed frivolous by
the district officer; and
e. consult with Congress and the Executive when emergency
situations arise.
5. Role of the State Department:
The district directors should be instructed to consult the State
Department only in cases where they have doubts on factual
questions;
The district offices should be required to report their determina-
tion of asylum cases to the BHRHA. This would allow the State
Department to monitor treatment of asylum applicants through-
out the country without participating directly in each decision;
In order to prevent undue delay in the resolution of asylum appli-
cations, the regulations should provide that if the State Depart-
ment fails to respond or set forth reasons requiring an extension
within the present forty-five day limit, and if the applicant so re-
quests, the district director shall decide the case without the advi-
sory opinion.
The role and training of consular officers should be reexamined.
In the procedures outlined in the State Department's July 18, 1980
Interim Guidelines for the processing of refugee applications, con-
sular officers should be given independent jurisdiction to make
refugee determinations without reference to the INS officer-in-
charge. Before undertaking this new responsibility, consular offi-
cials should be trained and a supervisory system be established.
The UNHCR and nongovernmental and voluntary organizations
should play a role in the education of consular officers and in pro-
viding them with information necessary to determine difficult ref-
ugee cases. The State Department section 502(b) Human Rights
Country Reports which are influenced by foreign policy and polit-
ical considerations should not be the sole source of information in
determining current conditions in particular areas of the world.
Coordination of the consular officers' work concerning refugees
could be provided by a supervisory official on each continent who
would be responsible for knowledge of regulations and operating
instructions, and for understanding of the social and political cli-
mate in each country and informing the consular officers of new
guidelines and procedures. In order to protect the safety of appli-
cants and their families and to prevent uncorrected erorrs or
abuses of discretion, a procedure for appeal of decisions in ques-
tionable cases should be established. This is particularly impor-
tant if INS overseas officers relying on cable summaries are to
make the final decision in cases referred to them by consular
officers.
6. Role of the allocation process:
A fundamental reevaluation of the allocation process should be
undertaken. The allocation of refugee numbers thus far indicates
that the geographical and ideological biases embodied in earlier
law will be difficult to eliminate. The Commission should give
careful consideration to this issue, and advise Congress and the
President as to how the allocations process should be modified to
ensure fair considerations of all applications.
7. Role of the consultation process:
If the official consultation process provided by the Act is to be
meaningful, Congress should be provided with the proposed allo-
cation numbers and the administration analysis of the refugee sit-
uation ninety days before the formal consultation is to take place.
This would allow time for the proposed "Board for the Determina-
tion of Refugee Status and Asylum" to hold hearings, and for
Congress to evaluate the proposal, obtain the views of nongovern-
mental organizations, human rights groups and the UNHCR, and
hold its own informal hearings.
CONCLUSION
Throughout the four decades which have passed since the end
of World War 11, the United States has attempted to define its role
in dealing with the refugee problem through administrative and
legislative efforts. The result of these efforts is reflected in the en-
actment of the Refugee Act of 1980. During these past four de-
cades, debate and compromise have taken place in the legislative
arena among competing forces interested in refugee and asylum
policy. The participating forces have been the Executive, Con-
gress and various nongovernmental agencies concerned with refu-
gee resettlement and human rights.
The records from their past debates are replete with references
to certain principles which became increasingly persistent
themes. The Refugee Act attempts to embody these themes by
recognizing that principled, humanitarian considerations must in-
form refugee selection procedures; that the expediency of per-
ceived, short-term foreign policy interests should not be the
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exclusive or even primary criteria in refugee admission policy,
nor should politicized decisionmaking dictate asylum determina-
tions; and that Congress and the public must be assured of an ap-
propriate, functional role. The legislation provides a sound basis
from which a comprehensive, objective and fair refugee and asy-
lum policy can be instituted. The key to the fulfillment of these
goals lies in the implementation of the Refugee Act in a manner
that does not violate its purpose or the legislative history that pro-
duced it. The recommendations set forth above can provide the
guidance necessary to such implementation.

